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ABSTRACT 
An Abstract of the thesis of Atsuko Sato for the Master of 
Arts in Political Science presented August 11, 1994. 
Title: A Study of Japan's Foreign Policy Behavior: The 
Discrepancy between Japan's Foreign Policy and Its 
Voting Behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. 
Japan has maintained a low profile in its diplomacy since 
the end of World War II, relying heavily on the United States 
for its security and prosperity. The cold war structure 
allowed Japan to maintain its passive foreign policy behavior. 
By the end of 1980s, West-East confrontations largely ended 
and global issues such as arms control, environmental problem, 
human rights, economic development, and ethnic conflicts 
became the main international concerns. It was expected that 
in this changed world environment, Japan as an economic power, 
would take on a more active international role. Yet Japan has 
not shown any significant political initiative despite of its 
willingness to contribute to international peace and 
prosperity. The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify 
the underlying factors that have kept Japan from being a 
strong voice and taking initiatives in world affairs. 
2 
This study presents Japan's official guidelines on global 
issues as its foreign policy. The guidelines indicate that 
Japanese foreign policy is too general and broad; it aims at 
cooperation with everybody. Japan's foreign-policy behavior is 
represented by its voting behavior in the United Nations 
General Assembly. Inasmuch as it has adopted a U.N.-centered 
diplomacy, I believe that Japan's voting in the U.N. 
delineates its foreign-policy behavior. A statistical method 
of factor analysis I apply in this study delineates Japan's 
stance and voting cohesion issue by issue. The voting maps 
reveal Japan's ambivalent stance on most of the issues. 
Japan's voting pattern often does not follow its idealistic 
guidelines. 
The study further inquires into the discrepancy between 
Japan's foreign policy and its foreign-policy behavior. The 
main reasons seem to stem from its dependent security 
relations with the United States, the close economic ties with 
Asian countries and the oil-producing Middle East states, and 
historical constraints in relations with Asia. In addition, 
Japan's ambiguous foreign policy guidelines are themselves a 
factor which creates the discrepancy. These factors prevent 
Japan from independently reacting to international incidents. 
Yet given its financial and technological advances, Japan 
could play a leading role within the framework of 
international organizations, especially on global 
environmental issues. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
After its defeat in World War II, Japan was obliged to 
follow the dictates of the Supreme Command of the Allied 
Powers. Even after the end of the U.S. occupation, Japan's 
political, security, and economic dependence on the United 
States continued and Japan generally failed to take any 
initiative for its foreign policy. The cold war structure of 
international politics was responsible for Japan's reliance 
on the United States. Under the U.S. umbrella, Japan 
practiced a passive or reactive diplomacy side by side with 
promotion of its interests. As a result, Japan today has 
gained significant power in the international economy, but 
its diplomatic profile has not shown visible change. Yet, 
international issues such as environmental protection, human 
rights, arms control and peace keeping confront Japan with 
the critical imperative of rethinking its foreign policy. 
Japan resumed its sovereignty when it signed the Peace 
Treaty with the United States in 1951, and its diplomacy 
became active after Japan was admitted into the United 
Nations as well as other international organizations in 1956. 
Japan believed that the United Nations was the source of 
international legitimacy and expressed the will of the global 
't 1 communi y. Japan therefore adapted a 
2 
U.N.-centered 
diplomacy. Inasmuch as this concept remains a primary fixture 
of Japanese policy making, and also in public dialogue on 
foreign policy, I believe Japan's voting record at the U.N. 
is a crucial element of its foreign-policy behavior. 
This study is composed of three parts and encompasses a 
series of objectives: 1) to assess Japan's foreign policy 
toward selected issues: international security; economic 
development in developing countries; human rights; the Middle 
East; and the global environment; 2) to inquire into Japan's 
foreign-policy behavior toward these issues on the basis of 
its voting record in the United Nations General Assembly; 3) 
finally, to analyze and compare the discrepancy between 
Japan's stated foreign policy and foreign-policy behavior and 
to find determinants of that behavior behind its policy. 
Al though a nation's official foreign policy may be thought of 
as principles or guides to that nation's behavior, it often 
does not conform with actual behavior. Foreign-policy 
behavior is influenced by a host of factors.(Fiqure 1) Other 
elements, including domestic politics, interstate 
relationships, and global conditions and environments, are 
also critical determinants of foreign-policy behavior. 
In the introductory chapter, I specify the framework of 
this study, and define foreign policy and foreign-policy 
1 Sadako Ogata. "The United Nations and Japanese 
Diplomacy," Japan Reyiew of International Affairs, Vol.IX, 
No.2, Fall/Winter 1990: 144. 
Foreign Policy 
I Domestic, Interstate, I~ 
and Global Causal Factors 
Foreign-Policy 
Behavior 
Figure 1. A model of foreign-policy behavior. 
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behavior. I explain the significance of the empirical study 
of Japan's voting behavior in the United Nations for studies 
of Japan's foreign-policy behavior, and review Japan's policy 
behavior in the United Nations with a historical perspective. 
In Chapter II, the foreign policy that the Government of 
Japan announced between 1988 and 1992 is reviewed as a set of 
official guidelines. Here I focus only on official statements 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of my narrow 
definition of foreign policy. A finding of this chapter is 
that the Government of Japan has general and broad policies 
that are not specific enough to react to pressing 
international issues and crises. 
Chapter III seeks, through examination of a series of 
resolutions in the United Nations between 1988 and 1992, to 
identify patterns of Japan's voting behavior. Applying 
quantitative analysis, I determine Japan's position on 
international security issues, the Middle East peace problem, 
issue of economic development in developing countries, and 
4 
social and humanitarian matters. Attention is given to group 
cohesion (which bloc Japan belongs to), and Japan's stance 
(such as negative, neutral, positive) on each issue. 
In chapter IV, patterns of Japan's voting behavior at 
the United Nations that were uncovered in chapter III and 
Japan's foreign policy statements are compared and analyzed. 
The analysis in this chapter finds a gap between Japan's 
official foreign policy and its foreign policy behavior. 
Japan's foreign-policy behavior is not necessarily a 
reflection of its foreign policy. Where Japan has not 
implemented its foreign policy through its voting behavior in 
the United Nations, I examine the range of possible factors 
that may account for the discrepancy. With recognition that 
foreign policy behavior occurs at the state and inter-and/or 
multistate level of analysis, the examination focuses on the 
impact of certain internal and external stimuli as 
influential factors. 
Since Japan has a broad, vague attitude of "being with 
everybody" and has a longstanding policy of cooperation with 
Western democratic nations, the foreign policy behavior of 
other states must be taken into consideration. Thus, 
international agreements, such as U.N. resolutions, and 
international discussions, such as the Group of Seven 
meetings, may constitute other interstate or global 
influences on Japan's foreign policy behavior. Japan's 
geographical and historical experiences are also critical 
5 
factors that constrain its foreign-policy behavior. The 
capabilities of a state, such as its military power and 
economic resources influence its foreign-policy behavior as 
well. 
In Chapter v, I conclude this study with a theoretical 
consideration of Japan's foreign-policy behavior. A key 
finding is that beyond Japan's lack of military power and 
natural resources, or consideration of its historical 
relations with other countries, it is the lack of a 
sufficiently precise foreign policy itself which affects 
Japan's international behavior. 
I would like to make clear two points concerning 
methodology in this study. First, while I consider that the 
nation-state has been and remains the primary actor in the 
world system, inter-governmental or non-governmental 
organizations and multinational corporations have emerged as 
important actors. Thus I concentrate on relations between 
nation-states and other international actors as a level of 
analysis. 
Second, the primary emphasis of this study is on 
empirical analysis. It examines and analyzes Japan's foreign 
policy and its foreign policy behavior on several important 
issues. Although the debate on qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to foreign policy study has not been resolved, I 
have tried to combine advantages of both approaches in my 
research. In chapter II, I focus on studies of primary 
6 
materials and documents to review Japan's official policy 
pronouncements. In chapter III, I employ factor analysis to 
assess Japan' s voting behavior in General Assembly. This 
quantitative method is particularly useful for extracting 
patterns of behavior from large number of events. In chapter 
IV, in the quest to find determining factors of Japan's 
foreign-policy behavior other than its official policy, I 
return to the material of previous chapters and employ a 
number of secondary sources. 
A STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN-POLICY BEHAVIOR 
The definition of foreign-policy behavior often differs 
substantially from a state's declared foreign policy. Foreign 
policy is defined by usually vague expressions of principles, 
national interests, aims, and conditions in the environment, 
not by the actions of the government. Foreign policy may mean 
different things to different researchers. Because of the 
diversity of its definition, the study of foreign policy may 
be concerned with the policies that states declare, the 
decisions made within governmental circles, the processes by 
the which governments arrive at policies and decisions, or 
the actions actually taken by their official representatives. 
Based on what part of phenomena are of interest to the 
researcher, there are three different definitions in the 
existing literature. 
First, Rosenau, who has contributed to general theory in 
7 
foreign policy studies over the past decade, has called for 
applying a comparative approach to the study of foreign 
policy processes and behavior. By foreign policy he means 
"the authoritative actions which governments take or are 
committed to take in order to preserve the desirable aspects 
of the international environment or to alert its undesirable 
aspects. 112 His approach to foreign policy is, in a broad 
sense, closely linked to foreign-policy behavior and he 
stresses that foreign policy is only one form of adaptive 
behavior in which national societies engages. The study of 
foreign policy as adaptive behavior seeks an understanding of 
common factors through a theoretical formulation. 
Second, Russett and Starr, concerned with the ideas of 
sovereignty and territoriality, define foreign policy as "a 
set of quides to choices being made about people, places, and 
things beyond the boundaries of the state. 113 Similarly, 
Charles o. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said define it as "the 
general principles by which a state governs its reaction to 
the international environment."4 
Third, scientific analyses of interstate behavior are 
2 James N. Rosenau. Comparing Foreign Policies (New 
York: Halsted Press, Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
1974) 6. 
3 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics (New 
York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1989) 186-188. 
4 Charles o. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concept of 
International Politics, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1970) 30. 
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concerned not with what a government aspires to accomplish 
but with what it actually does. According to these analyses, 
foreign policy may be viewed as "those official actions (and 
reactions) which sovereign states initiate {or receive and 
subsequently react to) for the purpose of altering or 
creating a condition {or problem) outside their territorial-
sovereign boundaries • .,s Precisely speaking, however, this is 
a definition of foreign policy behavior but not of foreign 
policy. Rosenau's definition is much broader and consists of 
both foreign policy and its implementation. In this study, I 
would like to separate foreign-policy behavior from foreign 
policy. Thus I define foreign policy as a set of guidelines 
by which a state governs its reaction to the international 
environment on behalf of a nation. 
The ambiguity of the concept of foreign policy makes it 
difficult to operationalize for successful quantitative 
research on foreign policy. A state's foreign policy can be 
seen in the formal statements which include three elements: 
1) formulation of the objective in the most precise terms 
possible; 2) the nature of the action to be undertaken, 
stated with sufficient clarity to guide and direct the 
state's officials; and 3) the forms and perhaps the amounts 
of national power to be applied in pursuit of the objective. 6 
5 Jonathan Wilkenfeld, et al. Foreign Policy Behavior: 
The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model. {Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1980) 22. 
6 Ibid., 31. 
9 
Thus foreign policy can be often found in the policies of a 
government or in the statements by a government's officials. 
After a policy is determined, based on the objective 
that a state seeks, and the capability for action within the 
particular situation, the policy will become identified as 
foreign policy behavior. The most important issue that 
implementation raises for the study of foreign policy 
behavior is that it shifts the focus from the process of 
decision making to the actor itself. Foreign policy behavior 
is not merely activities guided by a state's foreign policy 
but also behavior influenced by that policy and other 
environmental factors. As I showed in the model of foreign 
policy behavior (Figure 1) , foreign policy is clearly an 
important determinant of behavior, but there is a gap between 
foreign policy decisions (outputs) and foreign policy 
behaviors (outcomes). 
Foreign-policy behavior refers to the observable acts of 
individuals serving in an official government capacity. 
Because of the observability of foreign-policy behavior, as 
a dependent variable, a good deal of scientific research has 
been done. Analysts of foreign-policy behavior typically 
examine actual foreign policy events. Event data sets such as 
the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), the Comparative 
Research on the Events of Nations (CREON), and the Conflict 
and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) have been used for scientific 
research on foreign-policy behavior. However, event data set 
10 
analysis has been criticized for its unreliability and 
difficulty of validation. For example, there are possible 
nationalistic biases in the compilation of sources, in the 
choice of sources, and an overreporting of various event 
7 sequences. 
As an alternative, some analysts use roll-call votes in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as an indicator of 
international behavior. There are a number of reasons why 
voting records of the General Assembly are a useful indicator 
of foreign-policy behavior. First, the U.N. has a nearly 
universal membership and its frequent meetings and addresses 
provide a forum for a broad range of subjects on the 
international agenda. Second, all member states are required 
to represent national positions on every issue. And the 
General Assembly has also proved hospitable to member 
concerns by imposing no real barriers to putting questions on 
the agenda. 8 The General Assembly can thus be seen as a kind 
of global parliament in which all member states express their 
opinions on the international agenda. 
Thirdly, the General Assembly is the only one of the six 
principal U.N. organs in which all member states are equally 
7 See, for example, Llewellyn D. Howell,"A Comparative 
Study of the WEIS and COPDAB data sets," International 
Studies Quarterly, 27, 1983, pp.149-168. Charles A. 
MacClelland, "Let the User Beware," International Studies 
Quarterly, 27, 1983, pp.169-177. 
8 M. J. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics 
(Boston: Allen & Uniwin Inc., 1986) 2. 
11 
represented and which employs a majority rule for adoption of 
resolutions. Resolutions directed toward state conduct 
outside the organization are not binding of themselves, but 
the rules thus enunciated may have legal force if they are 
regarded as statements of customary international law or 
authoritative interpretations of the U.N. Charter. 9 Because 
voting behavior of the member states touches upon the final 
stage of activity centered on the adoption of resolutions, 
they take voting seriously. Finally, the voting data in the 
General Assembly are accessible and reliable. Therefore 
voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly represent the 
official actions of authoritative decision makers or 
representatives of nations. 
To what extent does voting behavior in the U.N. General 
Assembly also describe the foreign-policy behavior of a 
nation? The answer might be different for each country. In 
the case of Japan, however, voting behavior in the General 
Assembly seems especially salient to foreign policy behavior. 
To support this assertion, we must consider historical 
relationship between Japan and the United Nations. 
JAPAN'S U.N.-CENTERED DIPLOMACY AND ITS IDENTITY IN THE U.N. 
After its defeat in World War II, Japan's reentry into 
the international community was put off for more than ten 
9 Robert E. Riggs and Jack c. Plano, The United Nations 
(Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994) 22-29. 
12 
years. In 1951, the signing of Peace Treaty and the Japanese-
American Security Treaty were greeted with high expectations. 
In 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida said in the Diet: 
Chapter III [of the Peace Treaty] ..• stipulates Japan's 
acceptance of ••• Article 2 of the United Nations Charter 
and the confirmation by the Allied Powers that they will 
also be guided by the same principles in their relations 
with Japan. such a stipulation would be necessary if 
Japan were to be permitted to join the United Nations 
forthwith upon her recovery of independence. 10 
This enthusiasm for admission to the U.N. was held not only 
by the Japanese government but also by public opinion, as 
reflected in polls taken by the leading newspapers and 
. . J 11 magazines in apan. 
Japan had several objectives in joining the United 
Nations. One of the most important motives was the security 
guarantee. Under its postwar Constitution, Japan abolished 
armaments and renounced the right of belligerency. Although 
Japan established a defense force, it was impossible to build 
up military strength sufficiently strong to defend its 
security, since there were various legal obstacles under the 
Peace constitution, and economic difficulties after the World 
War II •12 A second objective was to contribute to world peace 
10 Proceedings in the House of Councilors, 12th Sess., 
No.3, 12 Oct. 1951, p.3, cited by the Japanese Association of 
International Law, Japan and the United Nations (New York: 
Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958) 79-80. 
11 The Japanese Association of International Law, 4-5. 
12 Ibid. I 228. 
13 
and security as a member of the international community. 
Japan, as the only country which had experienced the horrors 
of the atomic bomb, desired to take up the issues of arms 
control under the auspices of the United Nations. Third, 
Japan expected to solve its social and cultural problems that 
existed in Japan. At that time, it was not regarded as equal 
to the standards of civilized nations because of the problems 
of minorities, labor conditions, and the status of women. 
International economic cooperation, particularly with Asian 
countries was also one of objectives for joining the U.N. For 
Japan, with its industrial capacity, promotion of economic 
exchange with the raw material zones of Asia was essential. 
Having abandoned its past expansionist policy, it was most 
desirable that Japan's contribution to the economic 
development of Asia be coordinated with the projects of the 
United Nations. 13 
Following the Peace Treaty which became effective in 
1952, Japan requested admission to the United Nations. 
However, in spite of support by a majority of members, 
because of the one negative vote of the USSR which was not a 
signatory of the Peace Treaty, Japan's admission to the 
United Nations was blocked. After intensive multilateral and 
conferences and bilateral meetings with the Soviet, Japan 
signed peace agreement with USSR in 1956. At the same year, 
finally Japan was admitted into the U.N. under the 
n Ibid., 232-233. 
14 
sponsorship of the United States. For Japan this event had 
great symbolic significance for regaining international 
status as well as for strengthening national security. 
Right after Japan's admission to the United Nations, 
there was a high degree of enthusiasm and support for the 
U.N. in Japanese official statements. When it was admitted to 
the body, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigematsu expressed 
Japan's aspiration of its role in the United Nations. Japan 
desired to play a moderating influence between the developing 
countries of Asia and Africa, and the developed countries, 
given its mixed identity, as a developed, yet Asian nation 
and aligned with the West. In February 1957, Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi initiated three foreign policies: {l) the use 
of the United Nations as the main instrument of Japanese 
diplomacy; {2) cooperation with other free democratic 
nations; and {3) the promotion of Japan's national interests 
as part of the Afro-Asian bloc {AA bloc) • 14 Thus Japan's 
U.N.-centered Diplomacy was officially pronounced. It was 
generally interpreted that Japan should conduct its diplomacy 
in line with the objectives and principles of the United 
t
. 15 Na ions. 
Although Japan was supposed to take a stance as a member 
14 Speech by Prime Minister Noboru Kishi at the 26th 
Session of the National Diet on February 4, 1957. 
15 Yasuhiro Ueki, "Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of 
Passivism and Activism," Japan's Foreign Policy After the 
Cold War, ed. Gerald L. Curtis {New York: An East Gate Book, 
1993) 348-349. 
15 
of the AA bloc, this has not been reflect in its voting 
behavior in the United Nations. Saburo Matsumoto, a Japanese 
political scientist, researched Japan's voting behavior in 
the U.N. between 1956 and 1963. His study shows that the 
incidence of Japan's concurrence with the AA bloc was the 
highest on human rights issues between the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth General Assemblies (1956-1959). 16 However, the 
overall propensity of Japan to vote with the majority of the 
AA bloc was less than 50% except in the Eleventh Session 
(79%). 17 Japan began to express disagreement, not only with 
the positive neutralist countries, but also with the pro-
Western countries within the AA bloc. After 1960, it was 
increasingly isolated from other AA bloc nations. 
Using factor analysis, Hayward R. Alker and Bruce M. 
Russett studied voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly 
theoretically and empirically. Their factor analysis found 
that at the Twelfth General Assembly in 1957 Japan voted with 
the AA bloc for East-West and North-South issues, but 
isolated itself from the bloc on self-determination issues 
(questions concerning non-self qoverning territories). 18 
16 Saburo Matsumoto, "Japan's Voting Behavior in the 
United Nations," Japanese Politics; An Inside View, ed. 
Hiroshi Itch (Itheca: Cornell University Press, 1973) 188-
209. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Haywar R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, World 
Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1965) 82-101. 
16 
Their results also suggest transition away from the AA bloc 
to a strongly pro-Western position on East-West issues. And 
Japan continued a neutral position on North-South issues 
throughout the period. 
Although the centering of foreign policy on the United 
Nations continued under Kishi' s successor, Haya to Ikeda, 
after Ikeda, "U.N.-centered" diplomacy disappeared from 
public statements because of awareness of the limitation of 
the United Nations as the instrument of an effective 
collective security system. The frequent use of the veto in 
the Security Council, especially by the U.S. and USSR during 
the cold war, undermined trust in the U.N. as a bulwark of 
international peace and security. Moreover, during the 1960s 
when many developing countries joined the organization, the 
United States and the Western industrial countries lost 
control of the General Assembly, and thus the usefulness of 
resolutions declined. These changes made Japan suspicious 
about the effectiveness of the U.N. and diminished Japan's 
security expectations. 
Yet, its U.N.-centered diplomacy in terms of conducting 
its diplomacy in line with the objectives and principles of 
the United States was not completely dead. For example, in 
1971, the United Nations adopted a resolution recognizing the 
representation of the People's Republic of China and the 
following year Japan's diplomatic relations with China were 
normalized. 
17 
By that time, Japan had effectively became a member of 
the Western bloc or OECD bloc. Steven Holloway, using factor 
analysis, studied votes in the U.N. General Assembly over a 
forty-year period. His study shows that in 1975 Japan was a 
part of the neutral cluster within the OECD bloc which is 
spread over a large group.u Ogata, in her article, noted, 
since the late 1970s, Japan's strong tendency to vote with 
the Western bloc since the late 1970s. Despite Japan's pledge 
to promote world disarmament since its admission into the 
U. N. , the government's voting position revealed Japan's 
priority in cooperating with Western countries. One 
resolution, "non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 
nuclear war," had been put to a vote at every General 
Assembly since 1978. Japan abstained at the Thirty-Third and 
Thirty-Fourth General Assemblies but changed its vote to 
"against" to show solidarity with the Western nations after 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 20 
In 1978, the U.N. brought up a critical Asian issue, 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Asian countries were 
sensitive to Japan's actions in Asia for political and 
security issues. Japan, therefore, made careful political and 
humanitarian efforts through the framework of the U.N. 
Between 1979 and 1982, Japan cosponsored U.N. resolutions 
19 Steven Holloway. "Forty Years of United Nations 
General Assembly Voting," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol.XXIII, No.2, June 1990: 279-296. 
20 Ogata, Japan's New World Role 38. 
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outlining various conditions required for the peaceful 
settlement of the problem, including the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Cambodia and self-determination for the 
Cambodian 21 people. Japan also took a major role in 
humanitarian relief for the Indochinese refugees by providing 
funds to U.N. agencies such as United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , World Food Programme 
(WFP), and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 
Japan's U.N.-centered diplomacy came back stronger than 
ever in the official statements during the Gulf Crisis when 
the United Nations became the center of attention in world 
politics. The Japanese government again stressed a U. N. -
centered diplomacy to gain support by the Japanese people for 
the collective action authorized by the United Nations 
against Iraq. 
JAPAN AND THE U. N. IN THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Recent history has witnessed a changing climate in 
international relations. The Soviet Union, the former 
communist superpower, and the Eastern Europe bloc collapsed 
between 1989 and 1991. Cooperation between Russia and the 
U. s. has become more apparent, and the number of member 
states of the U.N. has grown from 159 to 166. The possibility 
21 Ogata, "The Changing Role of Japan in the United 
Nations," Japan's New World Role, ed. Joshua D. Katz and 
Tilly c. Friedman-Lichtschein (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 
29-42. 
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that the U.N. might become an instrument capable of 
maintaining international peace and security has become a 
reality. The General Assembly, in adopting Resolution 44/23 
without a vote in 1989, sought to strengthen the peace-
keeping function of the U.N.~ This encouraged all states to 
use the U.N. framework to consult and cooperate on global 
issues. 
At the same time, Japan itself has changed in light of 
its international responsibilities. As Japan has grown in 
global economic power, its financial contributions to the 
United Nations have expanded over the years. Along with its 
financial contribution, Japan has made great strides in 
securing representation in the various U.N. forums and in its 
principal organs.(TABLE I) Of late, there has been increased 
involvement of Japanese in prominent positions in the United 
Nations. Examples include: Sadako Ogata, who heads the UNHCR, 
Yasushi Akashi, who leads the U.N. Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), and Hiroshi Nakajima, who heads the World 
Health Organization (WHO).n 
It is true that Japan still has fewer staff than most 
other major countries. For example, it has less than one 
tenth of the staff of the u.s and about half as many as 
~ "A turning point in UN history: toward a search for 
common ground," UN CHRONICLE, Vol.XXII, No.1, March 1990: 4-
11. 
n "UN-Representative Japan," LOOK JAPAN, Vol. XXXIX, 
No.451, November 1993: 4-9. 
TABLE I 
JAPANESE FINANCIAL AND PROFES~ONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE U.N. 
year financial professional 
contribution(US $) contribution 
1970 5,316,227 46 
1990 90,000,904 91 
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China. While a further progress is expected, there has been 
marked improvement in the number of staff members and 
important positions in the U. N. lead by Japanese 
representatives. Japan's growing role in the United Nations 
clearly reflects the expansion of its worldwide interests. 
From its rather narrow focus on the affairs of Asia in the 
1950s, Japan's U.N. policy has come to encompass global needs 
and interests. 25 
In the 1990s, a changing international climate, along 
with its economic power, caused Japan's foreign policy to 
reach a turning point, as it returned to U. N. -centered 
diplomacy. U.N.-centered diplomacy reappeared in the 
international crises in the Persian Gulf and Cambodia. The 
u. N. Peace Cooperation Bill led Japan to face a dilemma 
between the interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese 
~ Source:The United Nations 1970, 1990, Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions;Budgetary Arrangement, Composition of 
the Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
Document. 
25 Ogata, The United Nations and Japanese Diplomacy 164. 
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Constitution and the obligations of U.N. member states under 
Article 42 and 43 of the U.N. Charter. The Bill did not pass 
the National Diet, although debate over it provided the 
opportunity to rethink Japan's foreign policy regarding 
military activities. 
By the 1990s, the Japanese government gradually began to 
show its a constructive attitude for U.N. peace-keeping 
activities. During the Gulf crisis, Japan contributed $13 
billion for non-military use, such as aid to refugees. Yet, 
except for sending minesweepers after the cease-fire, Japan 
did not assist the multinational military effort against 
Iraq. Japan's uncooperative attitude created international 
criticism and an opportunity to rethink the work of the Self-
Defence Force. On June 1992, the Diet passed a law that ended 
the ban on sending SDF troops abroad, but limited such 
deployment to logistical and humanitarian support, monitoring 
elections, and providing aid in civil administration.u 
Within months, Japan joined in U.N. peacekeeping operations 
in Cambodia. The law was passed because of the international 
criticism of Japan's inaction during the Gulf crisis and 
because the Japanese government presupposed that such 
activities would be sponsored by the United Nations. These 
incidents led to increased expectations that the United 
Nations would function as the most reliable international 
u Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Future of Collective 
Security," Japan's Emerging Global Role, ed. Danny Unger and 
Paul Blackburn (Boulder: Rienner, 1993) 112. 
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organization. Japan also seemed determined to avoid becoming 
isolated from the international community. 
Furthermore, these incidents brought about reexamination 
of Japan's global position and its role in the U.N. There is 
no doubt Japan continued to place considerable emphasis on 
the economy, but other states started to expect a more active 
Japanese political role. Considerable talk surfaced during 
1993 of giving Japan, as well as Germany, a permanent seat on 
the Security Council. 
Along with Japan's enhanced role in the U.N., Tokyo has 
assumed a more prominent role within the G-7 which has became 
a global custodian for many international political and 
security issues. The G-7 began as the Group of Five {the 
U.S., Britain, West Germany, France, and Japan) in 1975, and 
several years later Italy and Canada joined the meetings. It 
was created to discuss global financial problems. During the 
1980s, the G-7 summits added political and security matters 
to their agenda. Since then the summits have provided 
opportunities for member states to outline their own visions 
of foreign policy and to exchange ideas about international 
problems.n Further, it may determine what positive step can 
be taken to create a new international order. For example, 
the G-7's 1991 declaration on arms control with respect to 
nuclear weapons, proliferation, arms production and trade, on 
n Yoshino·bu Yamamoto, "The Role of the G-7 Summit in the 
New International System," Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.XII, No.3, Spring 1993: 161. 
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which Japan had taken the initiative, was a major step 
forward.~ Thus Japan may use the meetings to coordinate its 
foreign policy, including policy toward the U.N., with other 
major nations beyond the context of its bilateral 
relationship with the United States. 
Overall, Japan's fundamental attitude toward the United 
Nations has not changed since its admission to the 
organization. Japan has had high expectations, and trusted 
that the United Nations will play a central role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, as well as 
in the management of other global issues. In addition to 
respect for the United Nations, the Japanese government 
believes that it is beneficial for Japan to use the framework 
of the United Nations. Former Liberal Democratic Party 
Secretary General Ichro Ozawa reported, after an Asian trip 
in May 1992, that "Asia is not concerned about Japan's 
playing an active role within the framework of the U. N. 1129 
It seems that the United Nations has become one solution to 
a dilemma that Japan faces as its growing international 
political role runs up against its uneasy relationship with 
Asian countries that have always worried about Japan's 
~ Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of 
Global Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 152. 
29 "No concern in Asia: Ozawa to Return Home from Foreign 
Trips Today; Response Obtained Regarding PKO Co-operation," 
Tokyo Shinbun, May 7 1992, cited by Eugene Brown in "The 
Debate Over Japan's Strategic Future," Asian survey, XXXXIII, 
No.6, June 1993: 543-559. 
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intentions in Asia. 
Given the above reasons, Japan is likely to continue to 
use the United Nations as an instrument of foreign policy and 
bind its relationship with the U.N. more tightly. Yet Japan 
will continue struggling with its mixed identity: as a member 
of the West, and as a member of the Asian community. 
CHAPTER II 
JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 
ACTORS IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN-POLICY MAKING 
Foreign policy is a set of guides or general principles 
by which a state governs its reaction to the international 
environment. It can be found in a government's formalized 
decisions. In Japan, governed under a parliamentary system, 
a prime minister is the key figure in all foreign policy 
decisions. The principal foreign affairs specialist in the 
government is a foreign minister (vice-minister) who heads 
the administrative department concerned with foreign policy 
and is the principal official adviser to the head of 
government. The central foreign-policy coordinating and 
administrative unit is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
includes a policy planning staff charged with overall 
evaluation and planning of basic foreign policy positions. 
Because a major emphasis of Japan's foreign policy has been 
on economic matters, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry also are involved in 
policy-making. 
The Diet is the only state law-making body and can pass 
any laws consistent with the Constitution. Thus, the Diet 
ought to be able to exercise substantial control over foreign 
26 
policy by enacting laws. For example, in 1991 the U.N. Peace 
Cooperation Bill was rejected after deliberation in the 119th 
session of the Diet. Yet, despite the Diet's constitutional 
role, the opportunities to participate in the shaping of 
foreign policy are limited and most important legislation is 
initiated by the cabinet.~ 
The prime minister and the cabinet have access to the 
resources of the prime ministerial staff, which gives them 
effective control of policy making. The Cabinet Councilors' 
Off ice on External Affairs is formally responsible for 
"providing overall coordination on important items engaging 
the cabinet and for providing the overall coordination needed 
to preserve the unity related to policies of each 
administrative part, with particular emphasis on items 
related to foreign relations" (Cabinet Law). 31 However, the 
head of the off ice is seconded from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Ministry retains substantial control over the 
coordination of policy.n 
In sum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an integral 
part of the policy-making machinery, the working out 
~ Shuzo Kimura, "The role of the Diet in Foreign Policy 
and Defence," The Japanese Diet and the U.S. Congress. eds. 
Francis R. Valeo and Charles E. Morrison (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1983) 99-111. 
n Kenji Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public 
Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993) 
170. 
32 Ibid. I 1 71. 
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technical details, and administering policy outputs. Given 
the structure of policy making, this chapter will review 
Japan's foreign policy by concentrating on the Diplomatic 
Bluebook, which is a report published annually by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The "Bluebook" includes official 
speeches by prime ministers and foreign ministers at the 
National Diet, the U.N. General Assembly, or other important 
meetings. 
OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY 
The basic foreign policy of the Government of Japan 
between 1988 and 1992 has been one of contributing to 
international peace and prosperity while ensuring Japanese 
security and economic well-being. It has been based on the 
realization that Japan is a member of both the free market 
and the democratic world, and at the same time an Asia-
Pacif ic nation. 33 Japan is the only Asian nation in the 
industrialized Western camp. As a member of the Asian 
community, it has explained East-West relations from the 
Asian point of view at summit meetings and on other occasions 
in an efforts to deepen other nations' understanding. From 
the standpoint of maintaining security for the entire West, 
Japan has consulted and cooperated closely with the United 
States and other Western nations in arms control and 
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1988 (Tokyo: The Japanese Foreign Ministry, 1988) 3. 
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disarmament and other issues. 
Japan believes that exercising all due vigilance in the 
cause of security is prerequisite to maintaining the 
country's independence and prosperity and protecting the 
lives and property of the people, and that these objectives 
must be the basis of any foreign policy.~ 
To pursue its own security, maintaining a close 
relationship with the United States is vital to Japan, given 
the fact that the peace and stability of the international 
community rest basically upon the balance of power and 
deterrence. The United States' deterrent force is 
indispensable to ensuring Japan's own security, and the 
security arrangements with the United States are the 
cornerstone of Japanese national security. At the same time, 
Japan needs to have an adequate defense capability of its 
own. Under its Peace Constitution Japan is thus striving to 
develop a moderate yet effective posture, never to become a 
military power that would threaten its neighbors, to adhere 
to the principle of civilian control, and to observe the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles.~ Together with the security 
arrangements with the United States, Japan hopes that the 
efforts to enhance its defense capability will contribute to 
~ Ibid., 5. 
~ The Three Non-Nuclear Principles--not to produce, 
possess, or allow the entry of nuclear arms--declared by 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967 and adopted by the Diet as 
a resolution in 1971. 
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maintaining the security of the free market and democratic 
community and to peace and stability in Asia.~ 
To Ensure its security, Japan also seeks to play an 
active role in the maintenance and development of the 
international order. Former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita 
showed his government's intentions at the 112th Session of 
the National Diet. 
The international climate today is still extremely 
fluid, fraught with numerous issues including the 
further stabilization of East-West relations, the 
solution of regional conflicts, sustained world 
economic growth, and stability and development in the 
developing countries. Within this context, it is 
important that Japan, aware of its position as a 
mainstay of the international order, actively play a 
larger role and accept larger responsibilities from the 
global perspective. 3 
In dealing with these international issues, the Government of 
Japan emphasized three areas -- cooperation for world peace, 
enhanced Official Development Assistance (ODA), and 
international cultural exchanges. These became known as the 
three pillars of the International Cooperation Initiative.~ 
By its broad and ambiguous call for cooperation towards 
world peace, the Government of Japan meant a more vigorous 
and visible participation in international activities. Given 
a number of destabilizing factors such as regional problems 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1988. 6. 
n Policy speech by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to 
the 112th Session of the National Diet, January 25, 1988. 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1988. 5. 
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in the former Yugoslavia, cambodia, and elsewhere, and even 
international terrorism, the government wished to show the 
recent growth in Japan's national capabilities by its 
contributions to humanitarian activities under international 
frameworks. 
Japan intends to contribute actively in this area by 
making diplomatic efforts to build a solid foundation 
for peace, strengthening its international cooperation 
against terrorism, enhancing and diversifying its 
capital and other cooperation for peacekeeping 
activities, providing personnel for peacekeeping 
activities under the United Nations and other 
international auspices, strengthening its refugee 
relief, providing post war reconstruction assistance, 
39 and other measures. 
The second objective of Japanese foreign policy --
enhancing ODA -- is the field in which visible progress has 
already been made. There has been a sharp increase in the 
other industrialized countries' expectations in this regard, 
in keeping with the dramatic growth of the Japanese economy. 
Realizing that Japan has an important international 
responsibility to expand its ODA for the purposes of 
contributing to economic and social development, raising 
living standard, and enhancing welfare in the developing 
countries, according to the government, Japan is supposed to 
implement its ODA in keeping with the generally accepted 
ideals of interdependence and humanitarian considerations. In 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1989 (Tokyo: The Japanese Foreign Ministry, 1989) 
15-16. 
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addition to the above potentially positive means of ODA, it 
helps Japan to mitigate economic friction with trade 
partners. 
The Japanese government announced that under the Fourth 
Mid-Term Target, Japan raised its ODA disbursements for the 
five years starting in 1988 to more than $50 billion. This 
program also seeks to raise the ratio of its ODA to GNP: to 
expand the grant portion of its aid to enhance debt relief 
for the poorest countries of the world; to expand technical 
assistance, including the strengthening of provisions 
allowing foreign students to study in Japan; to promote 
cooperation through international organizations; and 
otherwise to enhance the quality of Japan's ODA.~ 
Promoting international cultural exchange is the third 
objective task for Japanese foreign policy. Japan has formed 
broad and intensive relationships with other countries of the 
world, but according to the government, friction between it 
and other nations often stems from misunderstanding or 
inadequate understanding of one another's culture and social 
practices. The government came up the solution that Japan 
needs to increase cultural exchanges in a broad sense because 
they transcend the differences of political system and value 
to lay the foundations for mutual understanding among peoples 
and because they promote smoother economic and political 
~ Japan Echo. The Japan of Today (Tokyo: The 
International Society for Educational Information Inc., 1993) 
28-29. 
1 t
. 41 re a ions. The idea of emphasis 
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on cultural exchange 
derives from its belief of cultural relativity that there is 
difference between Japan and other countries in their way to 
react international matters, and there is no way to compare 
based on one-side judgement. 
The collapse of the Soviet socialist bloc in Europe in 
1989 did not change Japan's basic stance. Japan welcomed the 
changes in the political situation in East Europe which 
appeared to show that former communist dominated people 
desired a free market economy and democratic government. 42 
However, in the Asia-Pacific region, tension and instability 
remain on the Korean Peninsula, in Cambodia, and elsewhere. 
Japan was expected to make efforts for peace in the region as 
well as in the other regions. 
In the area of cooperation for peace, the Government of 
Japan has recognized that its cooperation was not full-
participation in the international community. Japan gradually 
showed its intention to take steps to improve the 
arrangements for dispatching personnel overseas as well as 
continuing financial contributions under the framework of the 
United Nations.~ In 1989, for example, Japan sent a group 
of 27 people to Namibia to supervise that country's election 
41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1988. 10. 
42 Speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Nakayama 
at the 188th Session of the National Diet, March 2, 1990. 
~ Ibid. 
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for a Constituent Assembly. In February 1990, it also 
dispatched personnel for the observation of the election in 
Nicaragua. 
Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the so-called Gulf 
Crisis, was a major challenge for Japan's foreign policy and 
instigated a change in it. Tokyo realized its inability to 
give quick responses to such emergencies. It made a financial 
contribution of $13 billion to support the multinational 
forces and the affected countries in the Gulf region. Japan 
sent seven groups, with a total of 66 persons, from the Japan 
Disaster Relief Teams to the Gulf region immediately after 
the cease-fire to deal with environmental destructions and to 
assist refugees. It also dispatched minesweepers of the 
Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Gulf to assist in 
removing mines after the cease-fire. 
Japan's limited presence was a subject of criticism. The 
critics pointed out that Japan needed policies, capabilities, 
and legal preparations as well as public consensus to take on 
a larger international role such as peacekeeping. The 
criticism largely stemmed from Japan's human resource 
contribution: the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces for 
U.N. Peace-keeping Operations, or of disaster relief 
operations carried out by the Japan Disaster Relief Teams, 
can only be approached after lengthy deliberations in the 
Diet. 
The debate on what and how much Japan should do for 
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world peace and security continued. The Japanese government 
prepared a Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) bill, which 
authorized the dispatch of the SDF to U.N.-sponsored 
peacekeeping activities. Submitted in an extraordinary 
session of the Diet at the end of 1990, the bill gave greater 
legitimacy to the long-standing desire of conservatives to 
remove the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution. The constitution had been interpreted earlier 
in the postwar period as allowing the maintenance of 
defensive military forces so long as they were not dispatched 
abroad. The prohibition on overseas dispatch included 
participation in U.N. or other multilateral military actions 
and even U.N. peacekeeping actions. The opposition parties, 
the majority of the public, and·even some in the LDP believed 
the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas would violate Article 
9 of the Japanese constitution.~ 
Regarding the extension of activities of the Self-
Defense Forces, Japan decided to adhere to its Peace 
Constitution as a basic foreign policy stance. At the 45th 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
1990, Foreign Minister Nakayama stated: 
Since the Second World War, Japan has developed a 
foreign policy whose object, above all else, is peace 
and, inline with its Peace Constitution, has restricted 
its military activities entirely to defense, seeking to 
resolve differences with other nations through 
~ Edward J. Lincoln. Japan's New Global Role 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1993) 228-231. 
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discussion. The spirit underlying Japan's Constitution 
is based on the principle of the peaceful settlement of 
disputes that is embodied in the United Nations Charter. 
Thus ever since being admitted to membership, Japan has 
made the United Nations an extremely important part of 
its foreign policy. Japan firmly resolved not to become 
a military power that could pose a threat to other 
nations, to steadfastly uphold its three non-nuclear 
principles and to contribute to world stability through 
45 peaceful means. 
The bill was abandoned before the completion of its 
deliberations. However, due to the nationwide debate, 
including the Diet session, a perception had emerged that it 
was indispensable for Japan to make sufficient contributions 
to international peace and security. 
In September 1991, the Government submitted a new bill 
to the Diet concerning cooperation with U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations with a view to establishing a domestic framework 
for participation in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian 
international relief activities on a full-fledged scale.% 
Twenty months of debate in the National Diet focused on the 
conformity of the bill with the Constitution, the necessity 
of Diet approval, the meaning of U.N. command, and the basic 
principles of participation in the U.N. Peacekeeping 
~ Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama at the 
45th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
September 25, 1990. 
% Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1992 (New York: The Japanese Foreign Ministry, 1992) 
52-53. 
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Operations. 47 On June 15, 1992, the bill finally passed and 
authorized the dispatch of up to 2,000 members of the SDF to 
U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping activities. However, the role of 
SDF personnel in the activities was limited to noncombat 
support functions, including logistical support, medical 
assistance, and election monitoring carried out by 
peacekeeping missions under U.N. command.~ In this sense, 
Japan's military presence had little to do with the 
appropriate response to the crisis in the gulf. 
Overall, Japan believes that it can best contribute to 
the cause of world peace, and in a manner consistent with its 
Peace Constitution, by participating in United Nations 
activities. Japan also realized that it must further 
strengthen its machinery for conducting foreign policy in 
order to appropriately cope with the turbulent international 
situation in the pursuit of its diplomatic interests. 
In the post-cold war era, hope was widespread for new 
47 The five principles: 1) Agreement on a cease-fire 
shall have been reached among the parties in the conflict. 2) 
The parties in the conflict, including the territorial 
state(s), shall have given their consent to deployment to the 
peacekeeping forces and Japan's participation in the Force. 
3) The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain 
impartiality, not favoring any party in the conflict. 4) 
Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be 
satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its 
contingent. 5) Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum 
necessary to protect the personnel's lives. 
~ Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Security Policy in the 
Posthegemonic World:Opportunities and Challenges," Japan in 
the Posthegemonic World, eds. Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon 
(Boulder: Rienner, 1993) 103. 
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order for global peace and stability. Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa expressed Japan's determination about a new world 
order in 1992 at the National Diet; 
The whole world is today watching to see what role Japan 
will play and what responsibilities Japan will fulfill 
in light of the influence its considerable economic 
strength give it. This year 1992 is truly a year in 
which Japan mettle will be tested. It is essential that 
we bring our collective wisdom to bear in taking an 
active, independent, and creative part in building the 
new order for peace and proving ourselves worthy of this 
h . t . . . 49 is oric mission. 
He also said that peace is basic to the new world order, and 
true peace is more than the simple absence of war but rather 
t b d •t• . . h h . so d
0 mus e a con i ion promising uman appiness. Accor inq 
to Miyazawa, the quest for a new world order is therefore an 
effort to create an international society of respect for 
peace and democracy in which people enjoy prosperity based on 
market principles. 
The Gulf Crisis demonstrated how important it is that 
conflicts be resolved peacefully through international 
cooperative efforts led by the United Nations. Japan believes 
that the United Nations has an important role to play in the 
post-cold war international community. Japan has respected 
the United Nations as a central focus of its foreign policy. 
Since its election, in 1991, as a non-permanent member of the 
49 Policy speech by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the 
123rd Session of the National Diet. January 24, 1992. 
so Ibid. 
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U.N. Security Council, Japan has been in a position to play 
a central role in debates on international peace and 
security. And Japan has given serious thought to proposals 
for strengthening and reorganizing the United Nations, 
including enhanced trust and effectiveness for the Security 
C 'l Sl ounci . 
In sum, the Government of Japan has emphasized its dual 
identity: as a member of the Western camp, and of the Asian 
community. It adheres to pacifism, and since 1988, has aimed 
to play an active role furthering the principles of the three 
pillars of International Cooperation Initiative. 
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
As a member of the industrialized Western camp, Japan 
welcomed the improved climate of relations between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union that developed during the post-cold war 
era, and showed readiness to assisting in achieving a new 
order in Europe. Japan willingly helped the economic 
reconstruction of Eastern Europe. In May 1990, Japan agreed 
to establish the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
51 Since 1991, various proposals were made by former U.N. 
secretary-General Javier Prez de CUellar and the current 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. For example, Boutros-Ghali 
announced the restructuring of the U.N. Secretariat, 
including the streamlining of five political-related 
departments, such as the Office for Political and General 
Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services; transforming the 
Off ice of Special Political Affairs into the Department of 
Peace-keeping Operations; integration of the five economic 
development-related departments; and establishing a 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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Development (EBRD) with the United States, EC members, the 
Soviet Union, East European countries, and European Economic 
Community (ECC) and European Investment Bank (EIB). 52 Japan 
participated in the organization with an approximate 8.5% 
stakes, a level of participation second to the U.S. and the 
same as the U.K., France, Germany, and Italy. In addition, 
Japan provided technical assistance when it received the 
Soviet Union's Economic Reform Study Mission in November 
1989, and again in April 1990. 
With the general progress in East-West relations, 
Japan's expectations of improvement in Japan-soviet relations 
increased. Japan hoped to finally resolve the issue of the 
Northern Territories. Japan has long claimed islands in the 
vicinity of Hokkaido which the Soviet occupied since the end 
of World War II. The disposition of the territories has 
blocked a final USSR/Japan peace treaty. Japan emphasized the 
importance of the settling the issue, and called on the 
Soviet Union to enter into negotiations. Yet the Soviet Union 
denied Japan's requests, and insisted that an improvement in 
bilateral relations would get nowhere if Japan attached the 
issue of the Northern territories as a prerequisite. 53 
In 1988 the positive influence of the improvement of 
u.s.-soviet relations appeared in such areas as strategic 
52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1990 (Tokyo: The Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1990) 
29-30. 
53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1988. 230. 
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nuclear weapons and other arms control and disarmament 
issues, and regional conflicts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, which 
aimed at abolishing intermediate-range nuclear weapons on a 
global scale, was signed in December 1987 and went into force 
in June 1988. An agreement on withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan was also signed in Geneva in April 1988. 
However, while there were several noteworthy developments for 
improving East-West relations, the state of confrontation and 
tensions still existed. Of such trends, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sousuke Uno, addressing the 112th Session of the 
National Diet, said: 
Japan must continue supporting the efforts of the United 
States as a member of the Western camp. At the same 
time, Japan will continue to make every effort in the 
third special session of the General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament to be convened at the end of May and other 
forums to further promote international efforts for 
substantive progress in disarmament and to lower level 
of armaments step by step in balance. 54 
It is true that the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union is an important factor for arms 
control. However, for disarmament to contribute to true world 
peace and stability, the various countries of the world will 
have to strive to cut back on weapons through multilateral 
negotiation. With this point in mind, Japan has joined to the 
~ Foreign policy speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sousuke Uno at the 112th Session of the National Diet, 
January 25, 1988. 
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disarmament talks being carried on under the auspices of the 
U.N. Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and has called for the 
promotion of truly effective arms control and disarmament, 
such as the proposal of a step-by-step approach to nuclear 
testing issues. 
On June 1, 1988, Prime Minister Takeshita delivered a 
speech at the Fifteenth Special Session of the U.N. General 
Assembly and elucidated his thoughts on disarmament and arms 
control. Takeshita said that Japan, as the only victim of the 
atomic bomb, is ready to work for the ultimate elimination of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons.ss In addition to achieving 
nuclear disarmament, he suggested preventing an increase in 
the number of nuclear-weapons states, the realization of a 
nuclear test ban, the prevention of chemical weapons, and 
implementing conventional arms control. Although the process 
to complete disarmament and arms control will be difficult 
and lengthy process, Takeshita in his statement expressed a 
commitment to Japan's longstanding pacifist position. 
With the end of cold war, the issues of arms control and 
disarmament have met remarkable improvement. The u.s.-soviet 
summit meeting held on June 1990, issued a document of 
agreement to the principle's of the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START). Japan maintains as its basic stance that it 
actively participates in international efforts in arms 
ss Statement by Prime Minister of Japan, Noboru 
Takeshita, at the Fifteenth Special Session of the U.N. 
General Assembly, June 1, 1988. 
42 
control and disarmament. According to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, arms control and disarmament should proceed in such 
a manner that the arsenals of countries concerned are reduced 
in a balanced way and with no loss of their deterrent 
effects, thereby improving the security of countries 
concerned and contributing to world peace and safety. 56 Based 
on this position, Japan has been supporting efforts of the 
United states and other Western nations regarding START and 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). At the same time 
Japan has been involved with other wide-ranging disarmament 
issues, especially, the issue of nuclear weapons. 
With the background of the changes, the problems of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transfer of 
conventional weapons from the North to the South has come to 
be clearly recognized as a destabilizing factor in the world. 
It was made even more clearly by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 
Since Japan takes a unique stance in this field, which 
includes the adoption of the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" 
and the "Three Principles on Arms Exports57 ," it believes 
that Japan can contribute more to the world than any other 
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1990. 61. 
51 The Three Principles on Arms Export--which disallowed 
exports to (1) Communist bloc countries, (2) countries 
subject to embargoes on arms export under the U.N. Security 
Council's resolutions, and (3) countries engaged or likely to 
be engaged in an international conf lict--was declared by 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, and Prime Minister Miki, 
in 1976, extended the prohibition of arms export to all other 
countries as well, and in addition prohibited the export of 
weapon-related technology and production equipment. 
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nation in this respect. 
Japan's concerns about the problems of nuclear 
proliferation have been heightened by the Gulf crisis and 
North Korea's refusal to conclude safeguards agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Japan 
constantly urged North Korea to conclude and implement the 
full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Japan also has 
continuously asked countries which are not yet parties to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accede to the 
Treaty. 
In March 1991, after the Gulf Crisis, Japan announced 
its basic policy on the problems of international transfers 
of conventional weapons and missiles and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction in a report titled "the Japanese 
Near-term Responses to the Problems in the Middle East" in 
March 1991. In the package, Japan proposed the establishment 
of a register of international arms transfers under the 
auspices of the United Nations. At the United Nations Kyoto 
Conference on Disarmament in May 1991, held at the initiative 
of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, he announced in his speech 
that Japan would submit a draft resolution on the 
establishment of U.N. register system of international arms 
transfers to the U.N. General Assembly in the Autumn of 
1991. 58 
Japan also played an active role in sponsoring the Tokyo 
ss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991. 103-104. 
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Workshop on Transparency in Armaments in June 1992, and the 
U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues in June 1992, held in 
Hiroshima. 
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROBLEM 
Japan has usually taken the position that peace in the 
Middle East must be fair, lasting and comprehensive, and that 
such a peace must be achieved by fulfilling the following 
conditions: 1) Israel's withdrawal from all of the Arab 
territories it occupied as a result of the 1967 War; 2) 
recognition of the rights of Palestinians to self-
determination, including the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state; and 3) recognition of the right of Israel 
t . t 59 o exis • 
The Middle East is a strategically important region as 
a major crude oil supply source. Japan not only relies on the 
region for nearly 70% of its crude oil needs but also has 
exceedingly close relations with Middle East countries as its 
trade partners and host countries of its investment. Japan 
has continued diplomatic exchanges and has provided a level 
of financial support and food aid second only to the United 
States through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). In fiscal 1988, based on the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Japan decided to 
devote $1 million to the Multinational Force and Observers 
59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1988. 56. 
45 
stationed on the Sinai peninsula and to provide $1 million 
cash assistance to the socio-economic development of the West 
Bank and Gaza strip region by establishing a Japan-Palestine 
development fund under the United Nations Development 
60 Program. 
Japan considered the problem of Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait as a critical issue. First, Iraq made the invasion in 
flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. Japanese 
readers claimed that Iraq's invasion needed to be stopped 
with firm determination because it had defied international 
order and threatened global peace and security. Second, as a 
new order of international politics was being explored as a 
result of the significant changes in East-West relations, it 
was important for Japan, which was in a position to assume 
international responsibility, to play an active part in 
international efforts to correct such injustice. Third, as 
the Gulf area accounts for 65% of the world oil reserves, the 
area's stability remained essential in securing a stable 
energy supply. 
Because of the above reasons, Japan strongly denounced 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In August 29, 1990, Japan 
announced measures of towards contributing to the restoration 
of peace in the Middle East. According to the measures: 1) 
Japan would cooperate in the transportation of goods such as 
food, water, and medical supplies by chartering civil 
60 Ibid., 57. 
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aircraft and ships; 2) Japan would take necessary measures to 
provide materials and equipment in such areas as heat 
protection and water supply; 3) Japan would establish a 
system whereby a medical team of about 100 persons could be 
urgently dispatched.fil In order to make an effective 
contribution to international efforts being made by the 
United states, and many countries in Europe, Africa and Asia, 
Japan decided to provide a wide range of assistance amounting 
to $1 billion. In addition, Japan announced economic aid 
amounting to $2 billion for neighboring countries in the Gulf 
area which face serious economic difficulties, along with 
more than $22 million in aid for refugees. 62 
In relation to the issue of the peace in the Middle 
East, Japan decided to extend indirect support for promoting 
peace in the region, and took some measures as the first step 
towards bringing more balance Japan's relationship between 
Arab countries and Israel. Japan stepped up political 
dialogue with Israel and the PLO, which included the visit of 
PLO chairman Arafat to Japan in October 1989, the visit of 
Israeli Foreign Minister Arens to Japan in November, the 
Japan-Israel working level meeting in February 1990, and the 
Japan-PLO meeting in April. on the relationship with Israel, 
which had been relatively weak, the Government of Japan sent 
Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hisashi owada, to 
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1991. 53. 
62 Ibid. , 50-54. 
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Israel in January 1991 and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in 
June. 63 The dialogue between the two countries has been 
intensified and Japan decided to enhance its assistance to 
the Palestinian in the occupied territories. 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
Japan believes that respect for fundamental human rights 
is not only an important goal in itself, but also contributes 
to peace and stability in the world. 64 And Japan also 
believes that it is essential to improve the conditions of 
poverty and other social problems affecting the countries. 
Such beliefs stem from Japan's contention that the country's 
peace and prosperity today are founded on its consistent 
respect for fundamental human rights, freedom, and democracy 
during the postwar period. From this basic stance, it 
endeavors to actively promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms by engaging in activities at various U.N. 
organizations. Japan has worked as a member of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights for three consecutive 
terms since 1982, and was re-elected in 1990. 
There is a strong tendency to politicize human rights 
issues. The refugee problem is one example. Japan considers 
the refugee problem in Afghanistan, Africa, Indochina, 
Palestine and other region of the world as political and also 
63 Ibid. I 51. 
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1988, 75. 
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humanitarian problems. Japan participates actively in 
discussion on refugees and contributes to solving the 
refugees problem by providing aid through international 
forums related to refugees. Japan has provided about $950 
million in aid to refugees all over the world through UNHCR, 
UNRWA, World Food Program(WFP), International Committee of 
the Red Cross(ICRD) and others. 
On the issue of South Africa, the Japanese government 
adopted and continued to maintain various kinds of sanctions, 
against South African in line with its strong opposition to 
apartheid. To support people in South Africa who were 
victimized by apartheid, Japan began making donations in 1987 
to projects designed to support medical treatment and 
education. 
Japan sees cooperation to help refugees as part of its 
"cooperation for peace," and has positively contributed to 
international efforts toward the solution of refugee problems 
in the world. In January 1991, Professor Sadako Ogata took up 
the post of the eighth United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees the first woman to assume the post. Japan takes 
Ogata' s appointment as "the high assessment given by the 
world to positive Japanese contributions to the refugee 
65 problem." 
In 1991, Japan contributed a total of $160 million to 
assistance to displaced persons from Iraq and Kuwait, $100 
65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991, 162. 
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million to Kurdish refugees, $10 million to Palestine 
refugees, and $8.12 million to African refugees. 
For Japan, as a member of the G-7 and as a responsible 
member of the international community, it has become 
increasingly important to take actions based on the basic 
philosophy that human rights are a universal value for all 
mankind and are the basis for world peace and stability. As 
a part of a policy of respect for human rights, the ODA 
Charter, adopted at a cabinet meeting in June 1992, includes 
promotion of human rights as one of its principles in 
executing the ODA. Full attention is to be paid to efforts 
for promoting democratization and the securing of basic human 
rights in providing ODA to developing countries." 
Since the latter half of 1991, new problems concerning 
refugees and displaced persons have emerged in such countries 
as the former Yugoslavia and Myanmar as a result of regional 
conflicts which became serious in the post-cold war era. For 
displaced persons in the former Yugoslavia in consequence of 
the armed conflicts among the ethnic groups of Muslims, 
Serbians, and Croatians, in 1992, Japan contributed 
approximately $24.51 million. For 250,000 Muslim refugees 
from Myanmar in Bangladish, it responded to UNHCR's appeal 
with $1 million in March 1992. Japan has played a leading 
role in the international efforts for providing financial 
assistance. 
" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1992, 61-62. 
/ 
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In 1987, there was little improvement in the economic 
environment surrounding developing countries. Latin American 
countries were suffering from huge external debts, and Sub-
Saharan African nations and other less developed countries 
(LDCs) were unable to overcome the fragility of their 
economic foundations. Only the Newly Industrialized 
Economies, especially in Asia showed relatively favorable 
performances. 
According to World Bank statistics, the external debt of 
developing countries was estimated to have reached $1. 2 
trillion by the end of 1987. Heavy external debt repayment 
burden was proving to be a major problem not only for debtors 
but also for the world economy. To break such deep debt 
problems Japan believed that it was important to take into 
account self-help efforts on the part of debtor countries. 67 
The self-help efforts was to be done through the promotion of 
economic adjustment policies in cooperation with the IMF, 
World Bank, and other international commercial banks, which 
extend support in such forms as debt relief and provide fresh 
loans on a case by case basis. 
In order to promote the flow of funds to indebted 
countries, Japan decided in 1987 to recycle completely untied 
government and private funds to developing countries 
67 Ibid., 102. 
! 
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amounting to more than $20 billion over a three year period, 
and to increase grants including about $500 million non-
proj ect aid to Sub-Saharan African and other LDCs.~ 
Furthermore, Japan believes that for the economic development 
of recipient developing countries, overseas direct investment 
contributes best to solving the problem of accumulated 
external debts; as the flow of funds in the form of direct 
investment does not incur further indebtness.~ 
The most noteworthy of Japan's contribution to 
developing countries has been ODA. According to the 
government, Japan has been increasingly extending its 
economic and technical assistance to developing countries 
based on humanitarian considerations. Already the second 
largest economic power in the free world, in 1988 Japan 
increased its ODA budget by 8.8% to about $10 billion, 
surpassing the United States which earmarked $9 billion, and 
became the world's largest ODA donor.w In order to make its 
assistance more effective, Japan emphasized the quality of 
ODA as well as the quantity. According to the government, it 
extends loans as "soft" as possible -- meaning as close to 
grants as possible in terms. The Forth Medium-Term Target 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1988, 103-104. 
69 Ibid. I 97. 
70 Ibid., 108. 
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also clearly calls for qualitative improvement. 71 Japan tries 
to makes ODA effective by the globalization of assistance. 
Japan's ODA has been criticized because of its emphasis on 
the Asian region. In 1987 the distribution of Japan's ODA was 
$3,416 million (65%) in assistance to Asia, $516 million 
(10%) to Africa, $418 million (8%) to Latin America, $526 
million (10%) to the Middle East, and $68 million (1%) to 
Oceania.n In 1988, it was $4034 million (63%) to Asia, $884 
million (14%) to Africa, $583 million (9%) to Middle East, 
$399 million (6%) to Latin America, and $93 million (1%) to 
Oceania. 73 To increase the proportion of its ODA disbursement 
to the regions other than Asia, Japan has expanded aid to 
Africa. Yet the inclination to Asia of Japan's ODA 
disbursement has not been changed. 
In order to make its assistance more effective, Japan 
has also been promoting the formulation of country-by-country 
71 The Fourth Medium-Term Target (points) -- 1) increase 
the total amount of ODA more than twice from $25 billion in 
the preceding five years to over $50 billion in the current 
five-year period (1988-1992), and improve the ODA/GNP ratio; 
2) increase grant aid to and expand debt relief measures for 
the Least Less Developed Countries (LLDCs); 3) expand 
technical cooperation, and strengthen ties with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); 4) increase personnel 
contribution to international organizations, and promote 
technology transfer to developing countries; 5) promote 
qualitative improvement of yen-dominated loans and general 
use of united loans; 6) increase aid staff, improve the 
implementation system, and promote coordination with private 
sector activities. 
n Ibid., 110. 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1989, 91. 
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assistance plans. The government, for example, sends a 
comprehensive economic cooperation research mission to aid 
recipient countries. Since Japan emphasizes the self-help 
efforts of developing countries as its basic philosophy of 
aid, it maintains a policy of providing ODA only upon 
requests. However, according to the government, this does not 
mean that Japan reacts passively to the requests. It means 
that through policy dialogue with developing countries, Japan 
communicates the need to make their best effort to implement 
the aid with maximum effectiveness and benefit. In addition, 
Japan decided to take global problems into consideration. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs signaled a shift in the Japanese 
approach by conditioning aid upon the adoption of appropriate 
development strategies, limiting of military spending, and 
progress toward democratization.~ 
In addition, Prime Minister Kaifu stipulated that Japan 
will pay close attention to implementation of ODA by the 
recipient countries regarding: 1) trends in military 
expenditure; 2) trend in development, production, etc. of 
weapons of mass destruction such as atomic weapons and 
missiles; 3) trend in the export and import of weapons; and 
4) efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of 
a market-oriented economy and the guaranty of basic human 
74 Danny Unger, "Japan's Capital Exports: Molding East 
Asia," Japan's Emerging Global Role, ed. Danny Unger and Paul 
Blackburn (Boulder: Rienner, 1993) 155-170. 
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rights and freedom. 75 As to official bilateral debts, Japan 
is to apply debt relief schemes with due consideration of the 
funds required by the debtor countries' economic 
reconstruction. 
In June 1992, the Japanese government adopted in a 
Cabinet Meeting Japan's ODA Charter. This is the first 
comprehensive document that outlines the philosophy and 
principles under which Japan's aid is to be extended, its 
priority regions and issues, and points of consideration in 
its implementation. The basis of Japan's aid is described in 
this ODA Charter as being "support for the self-help efforts 
of developing countries toward economic take-off," as based 
on the following: "humanitarian considerations," recognition 
of "interdependence in the international community" and 
"environmental conservation. "76 "Humanitarian considerations" 
refers to the fact that it is impossible to ignore the 
reality that many people are still suffering from famine and 
poverty in the developing countries. The emphasis on 
"interdependence in the international community" means that 
the stability and further development of the developing 
countries are essential to the peace and prosperity of the 
world. "Environmental conservation" is also a task, which all 
countries must tackle together. As for regional priorities, 
the ODA Charter stated that the regional priorities of 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991, 131. 
76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1992, 35-36. 
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economic assistance will continue to be placed on Asia, the 
area with which Japan has had close relationships in 
historical. geographical, political and economic terms.n 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Since the global environment is a new area for Japan's 
foreign policy, Japan has not developed its own policy but 
rather follows the policy of the United Nations. Japan 
believes that to effectively deal with global environmental 
problems, it is important for Japan to play an active role. 
Japan also believes that the problem should be solved through 
concerted efforts of the international community, while 
trying to ensure "sustainable development," a concept 
predicted on achieving harmony between the environment and 
the economy, while giving due consideration to the conditions 
and needs of developing countries. 78 
In Diplomatic Bluebook 1989, environmental and other 
global problems were, for the first time, pointed out as one 
of the pillars of the International Cooperation Initiative. 
Problems, such as the destruction of the ozone layer, global 
warming, and the destruction of tropical forests, have become 
serious concerns of the international community. Although not 
new problems, those issues, for the first time, became an 
official priority of Japan's foreign policy in 1989. The 
77 Ibid. 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1990. 99. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its view about those 
problems; 
••• environmental problems have now assumed proportions 
that can only be dealt with on a global scale. Yet, it 
is necessary to pay special attention to the situations 
of the developing countries involving, for example, 
their complex national sentiments over the necessity of 
economic development and the environmental problem, as 
well as their population problem. The developed 
countries should help the developing countries 
effectively deal with the environmental problem, and 
international cooperation in financial and technical 
aspects must be promoted to give support to the 
developing countries endeavoring to protest the 
. t th' 79 environmen on eir own. 
The movement started as a result of Prime Minister 
Takeshita' s "Save The Earth" initiative. He placed high 
priority on environmental issues, and identified them as an 
area that Japan can lead the world. The initiative includes 
financial assistance to preservation projects, promotion of 
technology to develop environmentally conscious products, and 
Japan's leadership in international forums. 
In May 1989, a "Ministerial Conference on Global 
Environmental Protection" was set up with the aim of coping 
with the problem of global environmental protection by the 
concerted efforts of the various ministries and agencies of 
the governments. During the conference, Japan's basic policy 
on global environmental protection was set forth. Japan 
offered at the Arch Summit of the seven industrialized 
79 • • t f F . ff . Minis ry o oreign A airs, Japan, 1989, 115. 
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democracies in July 1989, to increase its aggregate sum of 
bilateral and multilateral assistance to about $3 billion 
over the next three years for environmental efforts on the 
part of the developing countries.~ The Japanese government 
defined its policy of extending cooperation particularly in 
(1) the study and the preservation of forests, principally of 
tropical forests, (2) in proving the capabilities of the 
developing countries to deal with environmental problems. 
Japan has been making positive contributions to the 
preservation of the global environment through aid to the 
UNEP and the International Tropical Timber Organization 
(ITTO), and other international organizations involved in 
environmental issues. At the 8th ITTO Board meeting in May 
1990, Japan announced a capital contribution of 
81 $20,130,000. 
Japan is gradually expressing its basic policy on these 
issues. 
In order to actively tackle global environmental 
problems, Japan should reform its socioeconomic 
activities, thereby becoming more gentle to the earth. 
At the same time, it is necessary for Japan to take 
active part in the activities of international 
organizations especially in the United Nations, as well 
as in efforts to build an international framework on 
global environmental conservation through international 
instruments such as the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. It is also necessary for Japan to 
support environmental conservation measures of the 
~Ibid., 116. 
81 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1990, 99-100. 
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developing countries.~ 
Japan has not only been active in offering financial and 
technical assistance, but provided support to the holding of 
international conferences on the global environment. 
At the London Summit of 1991, Japan announced efforts to 
expand its environment-related assistance by strengthening 
cooperation, making use of its experiences as an 
industrialized country, embarking on joint efforts with 
developing countries and offering cooperation in line with 
the stage of economic development in these countries.~ 
CONCLUSION 
Official statements by the Government of Japan reviewed 
in this chapter expressed a set of guidelines in broad and 
general terms. These statements sound idealistic and there 
was no clear foreign policy emerges from national interests. 
on any issues, the Japanese government emphasized 
"cooperation with everybody.• It has taken a dual stand as a 
member of the Western camp and of the Asian community. Yet, 
it is impossible to keep such an ambivalent stance 
simultaneously unless both the Western countries and Asian 
community share their interests, which does not happen in 
most cases. It can be said that Japan's emphasis on good 
relations with other states prevented Japan from taking a 
~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1992, 121. 
~Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991, 151-152. 
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clear policy on any issue. 
As for human rights, Japan had been reluctant to place 
this issue on its foreign policy agenda. (I will address the 
reasons for this in chapter IV.) However, the recent 
politicization of human rights issues, with its connection to 
others on the international agenda such as ethnic conflicts, 
promotion of democracy, and arms proliferation have forced 
the Japanese government to take a stand. The government has 
applied a general Western view as its fundamental stance, 
which respects the human rights as universal principle. 
The Japanese government failed to place global 
environmental problems on its foreign policy agenda until 
recent years. Japan has started to respond to international 
moves concerning environmental issues, including several 
U.N.-sponsored conferences, and to express serious concerns 
about some issues. As its basic stance, the government 
followed the idea of sustainable development, which was the 
policy announced by the United Nations. 
The Japanese government seems to lack a clear Middle 
East policy. It again applied U.N. resolutions as its basic 
stance. Because oil is a crucial factor of Japan's economy, 
its policies towards the oil-producing states of the region 
have made it difficult to take a position on the Middle East 
peace problem. 
on issue of disarmament, the Japanese government clearly 
expressed its domestic and international pro-disarmament 
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position in official statements. As for economic development, 
it seems that the concerns of the government are only in 
increasing and improving ODA. Behind the idealism of Japan's 
foreign aid may lie concrete national interests that aim at 
the possibility of future economic markets and compensation 
for the wartime legacy. 
Overall, without a clear foreign policy, the Japanese 
government has used financial aid as diplomatic tool. The 
government emphasized financial and technical assistance 
without taking a political stance. For these sensitive 
issues, foreign aid could be used as excuses to avoid making 
clear foreign policy. Instead, Japan emphasizes cooperation 
with other countries in the existing international framework, 
including the United Nations. 
CHAPTER III 
JAPAN'S VOTING BEHAVIOR FROM 1988 TO 1992 
This chapter examines Japan's voting pattern in the 
United Nations General Assembly as an indicator of its 
foreign policy behavior. It employs factor analysis, which 
allows us to study group cohesion and the direction of 
dissent, and to consider Japan's positions on issues dealt 
with by the UN General Assembly. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 
In 1988, the Forty-Third Session of UNGA was devoted to 
major international security issues. Among them were the 
United States and the Soviet arms reductions and regional 
conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan, the Western 
Sahara, Southern Africa, Cambodia, and Cyprus. In addition to 
these political issues, global climate change and 
environmental damage, and poverty and debt in developing 
countries, were important item on the agenda. 
In 1989, the world witnessed a sign of the end of the 
cold war with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe led 
by the Soviet Union. Thus the Forty-Fourth Session was held 
at a turning point of history. This event affected several 
issues in the General Assembly. For example, consensus was 
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achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union on 
maintaining international peace and security. On Middle East 
issues, the changing position of the USSR and its European 
allies challenged to Israeli credentials. However, human 
rights issues, regional conflicts, and problems of economic 
development in developing countries, were among the 
challenges faced by the global community. 
The Forty-Fifth Session in 1990 was the first in more 
than four decades in which Eastern European nations did not 
vote as a bloc and the first in which the German nation was 
represented by one German state, after 45 years of 
division. 84 Overall, there was an increasing trend towards 
discussing matters and acting on them in a cooperative, non-
confrontational way. 
There was hardly anything new on the agenda of the 
Forty-Fifth Session. In the General Assembly, nearly all 
items had been discussed before, except the issue of Iraq's 
aggression against and occupation of Kuwait. The Persian Gulf 
Crisis directed world attention to the importance of the 
United Nations as an instrument of international 
peacekeeping, and indirectly, to the indefinite postponement 
of the annual challenge to Israel's U. N. credentials. In 
addition to the situation in the Gulf, human riqhts, poverty 
and underdevelopment, and the environment were major concerns 
84 "Assembly agrees on major human rights, developing 
issues," UN CHRONICLE, Vol.XXVIII, No.1, March 1991: 4-11. 
63 
of the session. 
In 1991, the Forty-Sixth Session commenced with the 
admission of seven new states -- the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. 
Changes in Eastern Europe affected the pattern of 
consensus. Of 281 resolutions, 74% (207) were adopted by 
consensus and there was a sharp drop of the number of 
resolutions taken by vote (only 74 resolutions were adopted 
with a vote). Relaxation of tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was reflected in the number of 
arms control-related resolutions. The number declined from 62 
in 1989 to 39 in 1991.M It reflected economic issues, too. 
Emerging nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union became new advocates of market economies. Regional 
conflicts, human rights, and environmental issues, however, 
continued as the main concerns. 
In 1992, the Forty-seventh Session opened to high 
expectations by the member states that the U.N. had matured 
into an instrument capable of maintaining international peace 
and security. There was little difference regarding issues 
discussed during the Forty-seventh Session with the previous 
~ United States, Department of States, Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs, United States 
Participation in the United Nations, 1991 (Washington, o.c.: 
The U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) 4. 
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one. 
Of the five sessions, the issues of the Forty-Third and 
Forty-Fourth Sessions still showed the characteristics of 
the cold war. Significant effects of the end of the cold war 
were observed beginning with the Forty-Fifth Session. Since 
1990, the number of adopted resolutions taken without votes 
has increased remarkably. (TABLE II) The end of the cold war 
created a positive atmosphere of cooperation rather than 
confrontation in the General Assembly. The issues that 
required votes were very similar from the Forty-Fifth Session 
to the Forty-Seventh Session. It seemed reasonable to choose 
two years from each period for intensive analysis. I chose 
· the Forty-Third Session in 1988 which still reflected cold 
war preoccupations, and the Forty-Sixth Session in 1991, 
where the issues clearly reflect the end of the cold war and 
the aftermath of the Gulf war. 
TABLE II 
THE NUMBER OF ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 
Session(year) # of adopted # of consensus 
resolutions (percentage*) 
43rd{l988} 324 187 (58%) 
44th(1989) 331 215 (65%) 
45th(1990} 332 248 (74%) 
46th{l991) 281 207 {74%) 
47th{l992) 272 200 (74%) 
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FACTOR ANALYSIS OF VOTING RECORDS 
Methods of Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to 
identify a relatively small number of factors that can be 
used to represent relationship among sets of many 
interrelated variables. Because one session contains a very 
large number of resolutions{variables), it is reasonable to 
apply factor analysis for a study of voting alignment. 
Resolutions without a vote were excluded since such 
votes statistically inform us of few or no policy 
differences. For the Forty-Third Session, 137 resolutions, 
and for the Forty-Sixth Session, 71 resolutions were 
included. The voting records bf 159 states in 1988, 166 
states in 1991 were concerned. 
The first necessity in a factor analysis is to arrive at 
a method of assigning a number to each nation's vote so that 
its positions on implicit factors might be determined. 
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General Assembly rules and practices permit five different 
expressions of opinion on proposals: voting in favor, voting 
against, abstaining, announcing nonparticipation in the vote, 
and absenting oneself from the meeting. The latter two are 
without a doubt considered as not voting. The treatment of 
abstention is much ambiguous. The provisional rules of the 
U.N. General Assembly did not specify its effect. The precise 
86 Alker and Russett, 30. 
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meaninq of any abstention becomes clear only when an 
explanation of the vote is offered afterward. since 
abstention indicates at least the will of participation in 
the vote, I include an abstention, with an affirmative and a 
neqative vote as an important casting, and exclude announcing 
nonparticipation in the vote and absentinq oneself from the 
meeting. 
There are several techniques for transforminq "Yes," 
"Abstain," or "No" into ranks (ordinal measurement) or 
regular numbers with meaningful distances between them (an 
interval level of measurement). I decided to use the 
"standardized ranks" which Alker and Russett employed in 
their voting behavior analysis. The standardized ranks 
contain more useful information than the usual bloc votinq 
method of assiqning a +l score for any Yes, a zero for any 
Abstain, and a -1 score for any No, no matter how extreme or 
moderate the vote is in its context. 87 The standardized 
ranks are a more plausible approximation of the underlying 
position of the state. 
A "No" vote qets the lowest rank, "Abstain" a higher 
rank, and "Yes" the highest rank. For example, on a vote with 
20 "No," 30 "Abstain," and 100 "Yes," the rank assigned to 
the 20 countries in the negative would be their average 10.s. 
Similarly, abstentions would merit 35.5; and affirmative 
votes would receive a rank of 100.s. Subtracting these ranks 
87 Ibid., 31. 
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from the standardizing results so that the new voting scores 
have a mean of zero and an average squared value of one, the 
"standardized ranks" that result (indicated by Z's) would be 
Z(No)=-2.28, Z(Abstain)=-1.40, and Z(Yes)=0.87. Standardized 
ranks are calculated for each vote in the forty-third session 
(135) and the forty-sixth session (71), and each score is 
different from one another unless they have the 
proportion of Yes:No:Abstain. 
same 
There are two ways of factor loading: unrotated and 
rotated factor analysis. The rotated factor pattern is 
supposed to provide simpler substantive factor 
interpretations but does not contradict the emphasis on 
frequent or pervasive voting alignments suggested by the 
unrotated factor pattern. 88 Therefore, I will use only 
rotated factors for the final analysis. Factor analysis 
provides useful information that indicates the group to which 
Japan belongs. The data was drawn from press releases by the 
U.N. Secretariat.~ 
Issues at the Forty-Third General Assembly 
In the plenary, the wide variety of topics to be 
88 Ibid., 34-38. 
~ United Nations, General Assembly-Department of Public 
Information, Document No: Press Release GA/7814, "Resolutions 
and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its 
Forty-Third Session. From 20 September to 22 December 1988. 11 
Document No: Press Release GA/8307, "Resolutions and 
Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-
Sixth Session. From 17 September to 20 December 1991." 
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addressed included such politically sensitive areas as the 
Middle East, Central America, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran-
Iraq, Cyprus, South Africa and the Western Sahara. 
Issues in the First Committee were related to halting 
the nuclear arms race, obtaining a nuclear test ban, 
preventing an arms race in outer space, Soviet-United States 
bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, conventional disarmament 
and a chemical-weapons ban. The Committee also reviewed 
extended studies, such as the climatic and global effects of 
nuclear war, and the economic and social consequences of the 
arms race and military expenditures. 
The agenda items in the Special Political Committee 
dealt with Israeli practices affecting the human rights 
situation in the occupied territories, and the work of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East(UNRWA). A comprehensive review of the whole 
question of peace-keeping operations, in all their aspects, 
was also discussed. 
The Second Committee reviewed issues related to 
development and international economic cooperation, including 
trade issues. The external debt crisis and developing 
countries was main issue before the Committee. 
The Third Committee's voluminous and varied agenda dealt 
with items related to social, humanitarian and human rights 
questions. Major concerns were drug control, racial 
discrimination, self-determination, mercenarism, women, 
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refugees, and human rights. Specific human rights situations 
in Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador, and Iran were examined. 
Conditions in dependent territories, including New 
Caledonia, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and 
Western Sahara, were reviewed in the Forth Committee. Regular 
budgetary and personnel matters were dealt with in the Fifth 
Committee. The items of the Sixth Committee dealt with such 
matters as the new international economic order, peaceful 
settlement of disputes between states, and strengthening of 
the role of the organization. 
After examining a record 152 agenda items, the Assembly 
adopted 324 resolutions on a wide range of political, 
economic, social and legal issues. Of these resolutions, 137 
of the questions adopted with votes will be the variables of 
the analysis of voting during the Forty-Third Session. 
Voting Dimensions in 1988 
How many voting dimensions underlie the voting records 
of the forty-third session? To help me decide how many 
factors (voting dimensions), it is helpful to examine the 
percentage of total variance explained by each. Eigen values 
(variance the factor contains) for the variables are shown in 
TABLE III. The eigen values describe that factor 1 accounts 
for 38.3% of the variance for this variable. Factor 2, 3, and 
4 explain 9.9%, 4.8%, 4.7% of the variance respectively. 
Almost 80% of the variance is explained by the first 
seventeen factors. Thus, a model with seventeen factors may 
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be adequate to represent the data. 
The rotated factor pattern (matrix) is displayed in 
Table IV. Factors above 0.60 have been printed in boldface 
type. The first four factors represent important groups of 
issues. The first component of Assembly voting will be 
interpreted "social and human rights issues." It consists of 
Palestinian issues, and the living conditions and situation 
in Cambodia, Namibia, South Africa. Also included are issues 
of global human rights which affected by environmental 
destruction and warfare. The second principal component may 
be simply labeled "Israeli-Palestinian conflicts" because 
each variable above 0.60 in this factor is related to Middle 
East peace problems, such as issues of palestinian refugees, 
TABLE III 
EIGEN VALUE AND PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE, VOTING DIMENSIONS 
IN THE 43RD SESSION OF 1988 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var CUm Pct 
1 51.74287 38.3 38.3 
2 13.38530 9.9 48.2 
3 6.49502 4.8 53.l 
4 6.33396 4.7 57.7 
5 4.19665 3.1 60.9 
6 3.06604 2.3 63.l 
7 2.84491 2.1 65.2 
8 2.55715 1.9 67.1 
9 2.32343 1.7 68.8 
10 2.27460 1.7 70.5 
11 2.14585 1.6 72.1 
12 1.87414 1.4 73.5 
13 1.71744 1.3 74.8 
14 1.64538 1.2 76.0 
15 1.53295 1.1 77.1 
16 1.35797 1.0 78.1 
17 1. 32907 1.0 79.1 
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TABLE IV 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Variables Fl F2 F3 F4 
3 League of Arab states .186 .661 .114 .287 
11 Nicaragua:Judgement of .177 .125 .077 -.001 
12 Organization of African .111 .125 .003 .640 
13 South Africa:Municipal .127 .053 .044 .381 
14 Mayotte Comorian Island .598 .041 .126 -.003 
18 Law of Sea .169 .117 .084 .121 
19 Kampuchea situation -.163 -.041 .oss .022 
21 Palestine:uprising in West .112 .13S -.080 -.076 
22 Peace:right to .712 .079 .113 .102 
23 Atlantic,south:Zone of peace .398 .062 .S32 .282 
25 Falkland Island:question .201 .OS8 .048 -.18S 
26A Namibia:situation in .822 .07S .060 .025 
26B Namibia:Security Council .496 .191 .4SO .047 
26C Namibia:UN Work Programme .3S2 .082 .322 .198 
26D Namibia:dissemination of info .777 .109 .17S .044 
26E Namibia:UN Fund for .312 .110 .238 .222 
4S Decolonization .386 .225 .360 .003 
46 Decolonization:dissemination .317 .281 .297 .006 
47 Decade for the eradication of .aso .078 .204 -.040 
49 GA:Geneva meetings, Palestine .195 .618 .153 .154 
SOA South Africa:liberation .ass .114 .121 .108 
SOB South Africa:military .743 .126 .166 .060 
soc South Africa:sanctions .726 .062 .093 .081 
SOD South Africa:measures .S47 .097 .233 .081 
SOE South Africa:relation with .674 .109 .048 .012 
SOF Apartheid:Special Committee .439 .239 .522 .063 
50H Apartheid:dissemination of .810 .119 .135 .095 
SOJ South Africa:oil embargo .420 .117 .254 .262 
SOK Apartheid:elimination of .242 .117 .254 .262 
54A Middle East:situation in .522 .335 .148 -.025 
54B Israel:measures against .466 .291 .117 -.052 
S4C Jerusalem:character and .045 • 620 .112 .034 
175A Inalienable rights .623 .135 .155 .088 
175B Palestine:Secretariat activity .623 .135 .155 .088 
175C Palestine:Secretariat activity .556 .134 .247 .122 
176 International Peace Conference .186 .389 .082 .195 
177 Palestine:status in UN system .551 .173 .069 .100 
63A Nuclear weapons:Latin America .SS8 .196 .566 .069 
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TABLE IV 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(continued) 
Variables Fl F2 F3 F4 
63B Nuclear weapons:testing .784 .164 .299 .092 
64 Nuclear weapons:testing .180 .417 • 312 .102 
66 Nuclear weapons:testing .144 .032 .107 .056 
68 Nuclear weapons:Asia .726 .110 .303 .056 
69 Nuclear weapons:non-use .062 .366 .246 .522 
70 Space,outer:prevention of .093 .474 .269 .702 
71A Nuclear weapons:Africa .240 .546 .365 .131 
71B South Africa:nuclear .515 .274 .564 .129 
72 Weapons:mass destruction .182 .766 .242 .230 
75A Nuclear weapons:negotiations .503 .254 .725 .020 
75G Military matters:study on .056 .079 .083 -.003 
75H Disarmament .793 .218 .308 .070 
751 Disarmament -.045 .155 .162 .086 
75J Nuclear weapons:facilities .634 .193 .239 .056 
75K Nuclear weapons:fissionable .194 .151 .411 .232 
75L Weapons:naval, study on .172 .761 .314 .242 
75N Weapons:Sea-Bed Treaty .420 .232 .726 .034 
750 Nuclear weapons:IMF Treaty -.060 .031 .136 .036 
75Q Waste dumping:prohibition of .061 .061 .163 -.014 
75S Disarmament:regional .069 .270 .122 .093 
75T Waste dumping:radioactive .520 .237 .720 .069 
76A Disarmament: international .755 .172 .301 .069 
76B Nuclear weapons:freeze .471 .205 .569 .039 
76C World disarmament .428 .085 .762 .150 
76E Weapons:non-use .749 .158 .519 .086 
77A Security: international .649 .180 .505 .051 
77B Disarmament:GA .160 .297 .380 .401 
78B Nuclear weapons:non-use .719 .133 .460 .059 
78C Disarmament: international .517 .213 .626 .025 
78D Nuclear war:climatic effects .388 .102 .755 .165 
78E Nuclear weapons:arms race .630 .164 .632 .081 
78F Nuclear war:prevention of .617 .182 .641 .081 
78! Conference of disarmament -.087 -.001 .160 .067 
78J Nuclear weapons:economic .407 .276 .739 .046 
88 International security .808 .158 .301 .150 
78M Conference of disarmament .616 .183 .641 .081 
80 Israel:nuclear armament .395 .245 .337 .023 
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TABLE IV 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(continued) 
Variables Fl F2 F3 F4 
81B Weapons:verification UN role .110 .399 .32S .610 
82 Nuclear weapons .04S .2S7 .1S4 -.069 
83A Antarctica:minerals of .090 .024 .146 .008 
S3B Antarctica:South African -.1S6 .112 .119 .OS4 
S6 Political dialogue .828 .160 .34S .124 
S7 Declaration:Life in Peace .843 .149 .336 .097 
S9 International security .3S2 .142 .400 .016 
S7A Palestine:refugees .1S6 .821 .077 -.3Sl 
S7D Palestine:scholarship .14S .848 .091 -.343 
S7E Palestine:refugees .1S4 .914 .129 .199 
S7F Palestine:ration distribution .755 .319 .27S .oss 
S7G Palestine:return to .642 .41S .1S9 .017 
S7H Palestine:properties .625 .360 .1S7 .02S 
S7I Palestine:protection of .10s .847 .123 .126 
S7J Palestine:University of .1S4 .914 .129 .199 
SSA Israeli-occupied territories .soo .370 .04S -.012 
SSB Israeli-occupied territories .OS6 .808 .04S .106 
SSC Israeli-occupied territories .OS7 .855 .lOS .134 
SSD Israeli-occupied territories .164 .860 .123 .190 
SSE Israeli-occupied territories .09S .868 .026 .135 
SSF Golan, Syrian Arab:Israeli .096 .883 .oso .124 
SSG Israeli-occupied territories .094 .765 .129 .OS7 
GOA Information Committee .751 .323 .221 .026 
60B UN Educational,Scientific,and .S66 .400 .230 .OS4 
17S Palestine:Assistance to people .672 .073 .oss .24S 
1S2 Development:strategy .12s .347 .04S .847 
lSS Nicaragua:trade embargo .211 .106 .177 .247 
1S7 Money and finance .789 .OS7 .123 .2SO 
19S Developing countries:poverty .719 -.172 .oss .4S3 
197 Development:Assistance target .09S .1S4 .034 .892 
19S Debt crisis:durable solution .167 .061 .063 .811 
209 Front-line states:special .070 .lSO .067 .893 
92 Human rights and South Africa .815 .OS4 .266 .02S 
97 Apartheid:convention of .849 .020 .033 .06S 
106 Self-determination .808 .OSl .010 .02S 
107 Mercenaries:use of .748 .oos .137 .OSl 
110 Human rights and scientific, .934 .076 .OSJ .031 
TABLE IV 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(continued) 
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and of Israeli-occupied territories. The third voting 
component contains "arms control and disarmament issues. " The 
fourth factor contains issues related to "problems in 
developing countries." The questions of cooperation between 
the Organization of African Unity and the U. N. , international 
cooperation for eradication of poverty in developing 
countries, preparations for an international development 
strategy, fulfillment of the target for ODA, durable 
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solutions to debt problems, and special assistance to front-
line states are all included under the fourth factor. Those 
four components fully comprise the major issues before the 
Forty-Third Session in 1988. 
To gauge Japan's voting positions on each issue, I used 
a technique called 'plot by country.'(Figure 2, 3, 4) Figure 
2 shows the plot "social and human rights issues" versus 
"Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. 11 The plot represents two main 
groups, a Western industrial bloc and a developing countries' 
bloc. The United states and Israel isolated themselves from 
any blocs. Japan belongs to the Western industrial bloc in 
this plot, which took an anti-Israel position. Japan tended 
to affirm the resolutions concerning Middle East peace 
problems. It tended to abstain from questions of social and 
human rights on those issues that the United States 
constantly voted against. 
In Figure 3, rotated factor scores on "social and human 
rights issues" and "arms control and disarmament issues" 
shows three separate blocs, developing countries, the Group 
of Seven (G-7, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, West 
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan) bloc, and North-European 
countries and Australia bloc. Although the map shows that 
Japan kept a neutral position on issues of arms control and 
disarmament, it does not mean that Japan affirmed all 
questions related to disarmament issues (Japan actually 
abstained from half of those resolutions). 
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Figure 2. Factor scores on "social and human rights issues" 
(vertical) and "Israeli-Palestinian conflicts" (Horizon) at 
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Figure J, Factor scores on "social and human rights issues" 




Chile* 1.0 $ 
* *$**USSR 
$$ $$$ $ $$$$ 
$$$$ $ $ $ $ $ 


























Fiaure 4. Factor scores on "arms reduction" (vertical) and 
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Finally, Figure 4, the plot "issues of arms reduction" 
on "issues of developing countries," reveals the United 
States and Israel isolated on the in opposite sides on the 
issues from developing countries. Other countries, including 
Japan, took pro-Arab/anti-Israel positions on those issues. 
Japan's stance regarding issues of developing countries was 
very supportive of those nations. It almost always voted 
affirmatively on those resolutions, abstaining only from the 
proposal for a durable solution of debt crisis. 
To sum up the voting alignment of 1988, while Japan did 
not isolate itself from the industrial bloc, there was no 
indication that Japan took the position of Asian countries. 
Japan's voting pattern was very similar to that of the G-7 
countries, except the United States. Japan voted neutrally or 
positively on "Israeli-Palestinian conflicts." It took an 
anti-Israel position while the United States took a pro-
Israel stance. Japan's voting behavior on "arms control and 
disarmament issues," indicates a less negative reaction, yet 
not a strong pro-disarmament position, either. On "issues of 
developing countries," it took a slightly negative position 
that indicates occasional abstentions from resolutions. It 
tended to abstain or vote against the protection of "social 
and human rights." 
Issues at the Forty-Sixth General Assembly 
The Forty-sixth General Assembly was opened in a changed 
international climate that would help accelerate solutions to 
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ongoing crises on the world body's agenda. Changes in Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe positively affected long-standing 
voting blocs, which had built up during the cold war. In the 
plenary sessions, intensive discussions took place on 
reforming the work and structure of the United Nations, in 
addition to the old stubborn problems such as regional 
conflicts and South Africa's apartheid policies.~ 
In the First Committee, discussion was focused on 
weapons of mass destruction. Nineteen disarmament items were 
considered, as well as two international security questions, 
and one item on the question of Antarctica. 
Main concerns in the Special Committee were protection 
and security of small states, and Israeli practices that 
affected the human rights of the population of the occupied 
territories, and the work of UNRWA. Other agenda items in the 
Special Committee included: effects of atomic radiation, 
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space, comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-
keeping operations, and information issues. 
Items in the Second Committee focused on economic and 
humanitarian assistance or reconstruction. The external debt 
crisis was of crucial concern. The protection of the global 
climate for present and future generations was another 
important item. 
~ "Reform Proposals Circulate During 46th Assembly," UN 
CHBONICLE, Vol.XXIX, No.1, March 1992: 9-11. 
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Items before the Third Committee included Iraqi human 
rights violations in Kuwait. Other human rights issues, such 
as the rights of the population of the occupied territories, 
the human rights situations in Iraq and South Africa were 
main items. 
The Fourth Committee focused on the remaining 18 Non-
Self-Governing Territories, located predominantly in the 
Caribbean and Pacific subregions. Almost all budgetary and 
legal issues were adopted by consensus. 
Voting Dimensions in 1991 
First, eigen values were examined to look at important 
factors. TABLE V shows that almost 80% of the total variance 
is attributable to the first thirteen factors. A model with 
thirteen factors may be adequate to represent the data. 
The rotated factor pattern (matrix) is displayed in 
TABLE VI. The first component will be labeled "humanitarian 
and other global issues," which includes, such items as 
living conditions in the Middle East and South Africa, the 
International Convention on Suppression and Punishment, self-
determination, decolonization, and improvement of human 
rights, as well as international disarmament issues as they 
effect human rights. The second factor contains the 
resolutions about "Israeli-occupied territories," and the 
third factor is limited to the issues of "Palestinian 
refugees." The fourth component contains issues of "arms 
control and disarmament issues," especially those concerning 
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TABLE V 
EIGEN VALUES AND PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE, VOTING DIMENSIONS 
IN THE 46TH SESSION OF 1991 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var cum Pct 
1 23.71822 33.4 33.4 
2 8.06634 11.4 44.8 
3 3.86168 5.4 50.2 
4 3.18761 4.5 54.7 
5 2.89973 4.1 58.8 
6 2.45520 3.5 62.2 
7 2.02407 2.9 65.1 
8 1.89494 2.7 67.8 
9 1. 62463 2.3 70.0 
10 1.42799 2.0 72.1 
11 1.29222 1.8 73.9 
12 1. 27381 1.8 75.7 
13 1.10410 1.6 77.2 
TABLE VI 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Variables Fl F2 F3 F4 
9 Mayotte, Comorian Island of .624 .189 -.012 .077 
10 Cultural property, return or .528 .063 .027 -.028 
16 International atomic energy .002 .087 .098 .114 
19 Atlantic,South:zone of peace .061 .224 .050 .289 
24 League of Arab States:coop .123 .298 .232 .169 
71 Decolonization .567 .048 .173 .122 
72 Decolonization .588 -.042 .256 .147 
74A Committee the on inalienable .490 .160 .189 .080 
74B Palestine:Secretariats .457 .169 .185 .090 
74C Palestine:Secretariats .453 .148 .200 .088 
75 Middle East:International .428 .282 .160 .016 
76 Intifadah:Israeli-occupied .012 .420 .150 .084 
78 Law of Sea .116 .187 .394 .264 
79B Apartheid:Special Committee .359 .079 .176 .103 
79C South Africa:military .555 .069 .043 .019 
79D South Africa:relation with .552 .110 .059 .019 
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TABLE VI 
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX, THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(continued) 
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nuclear weapons. Those four factors represent main issues of 
the Forty-sixth Session. 
The plot of "humanitarian and other global issues" and 
"Israeli occupied territories" (Figure 5) shows two clusters. 
One cluster represents a bloc of developing countries, and 
the other represents the developed countries, to which Japan 
belongs. Japan took a negative stance on "humanitarian and 
other global issues," with other industrialized countries. It 
abstained from those resolutions which aimed at the 
protection of human rights. Japan, with a majority of 
nations, took a pro-Arab/anti-Israel stance, and affirmed all 
of the question dealing with the 
85 
Israeli-occupied 
territories. On these particular questions, the USSR joined 
the United states and Israel in taking a pro-Israel position. 
Figure 6 shows a plot of "Israeli-occupied territories" 
with "Palestinian refugees" with only one cluster which, 
contains developed and developing countries. Israel, United 
States, USSR, and Dominica isolated themselves from the 
cluster. Japan placed itself in the center of the big 
cluster, which indicates a relatively pro-Arab stance, but it 
shows a lessening of the pro-Arab stance taken in 1988. On 
the issues of Palestinian refugees, Japan again took a 
neutral position, which indicates anti-Israel votes. 
Figure 7 shows rotated scores on "humanitarian and other 
global issues" and "arms control and disarmament issues." 
There is a widely spread cluster, which includes Japan. The 
United States and Great Britain took extremely negative 
positions on issues of arms reduction. It means that they 
tended to reject the proposals of arms reduction. Japan's 
stance on issues of arms reduction was slightly positive, 
which suggests it abstained or affirmed those resolutions 
with other countries. 
In sum, Japan never isolated itself from the bloc of 
industrialized countries, especially G-7 countries, on any 
issues in the Forty-Sixth Session. 
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Figure 5. Factor scores on "humanitarian and other global 
issues" (Vertical) and "Israeli-occupied territories" 
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Figure 6. Factor scores on "Israeli-occupied territories" 
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Figure 7. Factor scores on "humanitarian and other global 
issues" (Vertical) and "arms control and disarmament" 
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Throughout the Forty-Third and the Forty-Sixth General 
Assemblies, Japan always voted with the other industrial 
countries: it never appeared with the Asian countries. 
Especially, Japan's concurrences with G-7 countries were very 
significant throughout the years. Because cooperation with 
Western countries has been priority for Japan, discussion in 
meetings which provide for mutual coordination have affected 
its foreign-policy behavior. Moreover, since Japan is not 
involved in any other institutional policy-coordinating 
mechanism on political issues, the G-7 is the only possible 
framework for effective policy consultation and coordination. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to observe Japan's solidarity 
with G-7 members in the General Assembly. 
On issues of arms reduction, Japan's voting behavior is 
neutral. It took the same position as other industrialized 
countries. Although the official statements repeated its 
positive, active pacifistic position, and were strongly 
against use and threats of use of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons, and favored a nuclear freeze, this policy did not 
appear in Japan's voting behavior in the UNGA. Instead, Japan 
abstained from a number of resolutions concerning arms 
control. 
On Middle East peace problems, it carefully took the 
same position as other G-7 members, except the United States, 
which took an extreme pro-Israel position. Japan tended to 
90 
take a pro-Arab position, even though a number of abstentions 
can not be ignored. Observably, its pro-Arab stance in 1988 
was much stronger than that in 1991. While there seemed to be 
no consistent policy toward these issues, Japan did not 
necessarily follow u.s. policy, either. 
Japan's voting behavior on human rights issues did not 
reflect its philosophy that human rights are a universal 
value due all humanity. The voting score of human rights 
issues shows negative score in 1988 and 1991. However, since 
the concurrence with other developed nations on these issues 
was very high, Japan's position on human rights issues was 
not so different from those of other industrialized 
countries. The real problem of Japan's voting behavior on 
this issue is a large number of abstention which made its 
position relatively negative. 
There are some changes in the voting alignment between 
1988 and 1991 sessions because of the end of the cold war. 
There was no longer bloc solidarity between Eastern European 
countries and USSR. In 1991, the USSR closely cooperated with 
G-7 states. However, it did not affect Japan's voting 
behavior in the period. Japan, in the Forty-Third and the 
Forty-sixth Sessions, cooperated with all G-7 members except 
the United States. I believe that the annual summit meetings 
are clearly an important factor in Japan's foreign-policy 
behavior. 
Factor analysis provided the group cohesion that shows 
91 
Japan belongs to the Western democratic states, especially G-
7 countries. Furthermore, this study found that Japan's 
voting behavior did not reflect its stated foreign policy. 
Moreover, there were a number of abstentions on issues, which 
can be interpreted as mild doubt, a disinclination to go on 
record as supporting or opposing some idea, lack of timely 
instruction from home, cross-pressures resulting from the 
fact that friendly states are not all taking the same view, 
or strong opposition to some part of a decision. 91 The 
precise meaning of any abstention needs further 
investigation. The next chapter will analyze the gap between 
Japan's foreign policy (a set of official guidelines) and its 
foreign-policy behavior (implementation of foreign policy). 
At the same time, it will seek explanations for Japan's 
abstentions. 
91 Peterson, 65. 
CHAPTER IV 
A COMPARISON OF FOREIGN POLICY TO FOREIGN-POLICY BEHAVIOR 
In this chapter, Japan's professed foreign policy and 
its foreign-policy behavior will be compared and analyzed 
issue by issue based on findings in the previous chapters. 
The chapter further seeks to explain the contradiction 
between Japan's stated positions and its voting behavior in 
the UNGA. It addresses such conflicts by focusing on domestic 
cultural and historical constraints, and inter- and 
multistate factors that may affect foreign-policy behavior. 
The chapter also gives attention to the critical events of 
the period between 1988 and 1992, dominated by the end of the 
cold war and the Gulf Crisis, that may have influenced 
Japan's foreign policy and its implementation. Issues that 
were major agenda items in the United Nations and recent 
primary concerns in Japan's foreign policy include arms 
control and disarmament; economic development in developing 
countries; humanitarian issues; the Middle East peace 
problem; and the global environment. 
JAPAN'S BASIC STANCE 
The Government of Japan sought to maintain its role as 
a member of both the West and a participant in the Asian 
93 
community during the cold war. However, as illustrated by the 
voting maps, Japan has always put itself in the group of 
industrial countries. There is no evidence from the voting 
maps that Asian countries influenced Japan's voting behavior. 
Japan's voting records do not reveal cooperation with other 
Asian nations. In other words, Japan's voting behavior does 
not reflect its supposedly dual position in world affairs. 
Japan's fundamental position as a member of the Western 
industrial bloc is much stronger. It can be said that Japan 
is aware of its geographic, historical and regional 
responsibility as a member of the Asia-Pacific; but its much 
stronger roles are as a upholder of the Western ideology of 
free, democratic, market economies and as an intermediator 
between Western nations and Asian countries. 
Japan acquired the status of a world economic power in 
the mid-1970s. It has consolidated its position, not only in 
economic but also the political and security dimensions of 
the Western partnership, since the early 1980s. The annual G-
7 summit meetings have given Japan a platform to express its 
opinion about world problems as seen from its corner of Asia. 
At earlier G-7 meetings, Japan was often criticized by 
Western allies because of its soaring trade surplus with the 
Western industrialized countries. At the Toronto summit in 
1988, however, Japan played an active role as an 
intermediator presenting Asia's interests, including those of 
the newly industrializing economies. Japan demanded 
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international aid to the Philippines and support for the 
Seoul Olympic Games, and recalled the need for a peace 
settlement in Cambodia.~ 
As a member of the Asian community, Japan has 
aggressively cultivated friendly ties with the Association of 
South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN -- Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia) since the 
announcement of the "Fukuda Doctrine." When Prime Minister 
Fukuda visited the ASEAN countries in 1978, he announced that 
Japan would never again become a military power, would 
establish ties on an equal footing with governments of the 
region and would strive to develop "heart to heart 
relationships" with Asian countries. This expression appealed 
to people's emotions and had an even more profound effect 
than the commitment to economic assistance. 93 Since 1978, 
Japan as a regular participant in annual dialogue with the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers, has taken on added economic 
responsibilities. Moreover, Japan has consistently supported 
the ASEAN policy in favor of a comprehensive political 
settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Tokyo has pledged its 
support for and participation in the U.N.-administered 
postwar settlement in Cambodia and the post-conflict 
~ Shiro Saito, Japan at the Summit; Japan's role in the 
Western Alliance and Asian Pacific co-operation (New York; 
Routledge, 1990) 97. 
93 Masahide Shibusawa, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region 
(New York; Routledge, 1989) 106. 
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reconstruction of the Indochinese economies.~ 
Since a number of security issues in East Asia remain 
unsolved despite the end of the cold war, Japan maintains a 
strong interest in solving regional disputes. During the July 
1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) in Kulua 
Lumpur, Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, proposed the 
institutionalization of an annual forum on regional security 
matters at which ASEAN and other interested parties could 
exchange views on the matters. Tokyo was stimulated by 
similar proposals announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
middle of the 1980s, and by Australia's call for a Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Asia in 1990. 95 Although 
Tokyo's intention was not to organize a regional-wide 
security system, but to promote political dialogue, Japan 
could not avoid the suspicions of some Asian states. In 
addition, initially the United States under the Bush 
administration showed little interest in this proposal, 
clearly preferring the existing U.S. structure of bilateral 
security pacts with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, 
~ Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, "Introduction: Japan 
and the Posthegemonic World," Japan in the Posthegemonic 
World (Boulder: Rienner, 1993) 12. 
95 Yoshida Soeya, "The Evolution of Japanese Thinking and 
Policies on Cooperative Security in the 1980s and 1990s," 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.XXXXVIII, 
No.l, May 1994: 87. 
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and the Philippines. 96 In 1992, the leader of the ASEAN 
countries finally agreed to intensify external dialogue on 
political security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC structure. 
Under the Clinton administration U.S. policy has been to 
endorse the political dialogue in the ASEAN-PMC (though it 
has not made a clear desire to erect an alternative security 
structure, as opposed to increased burden-sharing within a 
continuing framework of the U.S.-led alliance system).~ 
Eventually, Japan's effort to promote political dialogue was 
remunerated. 
Compared with the security agenda, Japan found a 
positive and active role promoting economic cooperation in 
the region. It has provided a persuasive set of economic 
inducements, including foreign aid, commercial loans, 
technological transfer, direct investment, and preferential 
access to the Japanese market. As a member of the Asian 
community, Japan has undertaken impressive economic 
responsibilities in the region. 
Just as growing economic regionalism has taken hold in 
Europe and North America, in the Asia-Pacific there is 
increasing enthusiasm for a regional trade framework among 
some nations. The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
96 Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question; Power and 
Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.; The AEI Press, 1992) 
145. 
~ Charles E. Morrison, "The United States and 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.XXXXVIII, No.1, May 1994; 72-73. 
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Conference (APEC) in November 1989 was held in Canberra at 
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's initiative, and was 
enthusiastically supported by South Korea. Yet Japan did not 
move actively until the United States, which had not been 
included in the initial Australian scheme, decided to join 
it. Japan's reluctance to formulate a regional framework 
stems from its dependence on the U.S. market, as well as from 
its residual guilt in the postwar era. The latter was 
exacerbated by repeated warnings from Asian leaders about 
Japan's "new ambition. 1198 Since 1991, China, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong joined the twelve original participants of APEC: the six 
members of ASEAN, the United states, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. By increasing the number 
of participants, APEC can be a forum in which a regional 
economic cooperation is promoted and regional uncertainties 
are reduced. It is a preferable framework for Japan since it 
does not force Japan to make a choice between North America 
and Asian trade partners. 
As Japan's importance increases in the Western summits 
and the ASEAN dialogue, it seems that Japan has begun to 
overcome the traditional conflict between its roles in the 
West and Asia, in both the economic and the political 
dimensions. Japan has done this by playing an intermediary 
98 Yoichi Funabashi, "Introduction: Japan's International 
Agenda for the 1990s," Japan's International Agenda, ed. 
Yoichi Funabashi (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 
9. 
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role between the West and Asia. However, it has neither found 
a meaningful way to link the two roles, nor has it played a 
major part in either camp in regional and global issues. 
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
Since the arms race was mainly prompted by the cold war, 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of 
the communist governments of Eastern Europe were supposed to 
create a less violent world. To some extent negotiations on 
arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union 
reduced nuclear and conventional war arsenals. However, the 
end of the cold war has also made clear the need for more 
comprehensive arms control. The East European countries have 
left the control of the former Soviet bloc's thousands of 
warheads in doubt. There are fears that these economically 
troubled countries, hungry for cash, will sell nuclear 
weapons and technology to developing nations in Asia and 
elsewhere. An example of proliferation of weapons was clearly 
observed during Persian Gulf War in Iraq's use of Scud 
missiles. Further, it was revealed by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iraq had secretly produced 
enriched uranium, which could be used as a material for 
nuclear 99 weapons. In addition, there is evidence that 
several countries, including India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea, have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. 
99 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991, 97. 
99 
Concerning arms control and disarmament issues, the 
Government of Japan has long urged the elimination of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. However, 
despite a number of official statements which support world 
disarmament, Japan's voting behavior in the UNGA on 
disarmament issues has been inconsistent. Even on issues of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear war, Japan often abstained, and 
sometimes voted against arms control resolutions. Japan's 
voting behavior at the Forty-Third and Forty-Sixth Sessions 
shows a reluctance to respond actively on disarmament issues. 
For example, in the Forty-Third Session, Japan abstained from 
the resolutions related to issues of nuclear weapons, 
including: "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 
disarmament, 11100 which reaffirmed that both bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations on the nuclear and space arms race 
are by nature complementary to one another, and requested the 
Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at 
the beginning of its 1989 session; and "Prevention of nuclear 
war, 11101 which requested the Conference on Disarmament to 
undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations 
with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and 
100 Resolution 43/7SE: No-13 (Belgium, Canada, France, 
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey); Abstain-5 (Australia, Denmark, 
Iceland, Israel, Japan); Yes-other 135 countries. 
101 Resolution 43/78F: No-3 (France, UK, USA); Abstain-14 
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey); Yes-other 136 countries. 
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practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted 
individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to 
establish for that purpose an ad hoc . committee on the 
subjects at the beginning of its 1989 session. Japan voted 
against "nuclear weapon freeze, 11102 which urged the United 
States and the Soviet Union, as the two major nuclear-weapon 
states, to agree to an immediate nuclear arms freeze, and 
called upon all nuclear-weapon states to agree through a 
joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze. It 
also voted against "convention on the prohibition of use of 
nuclear weapons, "103 which reiterated its request to the 
Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, in order 
to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any 
circumstances. In the Forty-Sixth Session, it abstained on 
such resolutions of anti-war measures of the "convention on 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons, 11104 and a "comprehensive 
102 Resolution 43/76B: No-12 (Belgium, Canada, France, 
West Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Turkey, UK, USA); Abstain-3 (China, Iceland, Spain); Yes-
other 135 countries. 
103 Resolution 43/76E: No-17 (Australia, Belgium, canada, 
Denmark, France, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand); Abstain-4 (Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan); Yes-other 133 countries. 
104 Resolution 46/37D: No-16 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA); Abstain-
23 (Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Finland, Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Marshal Islands, 
Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, 
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• ,10s h. h programme of disarmament,' w ic requested the Conference 
on Disarmament to reestablish, at the beginning of its 1992 
session, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme 
of Disarmament. 
Japan's abstentions from sensitive disarmament issues 
seem not to reflect its foreign policy of ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons. Rather, its 
voting behavior seems to be the result of prioritizing 
cooperation with the Western nations. The United states and 
the United Kingdom tended to oppose disarmament issues, and 
when they did so, Japan tended to either abstain or vote 
against. This tendency can be seen in the voting behavior of 
other Western nations such as Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, and Italy. Hence, Japan's voting concurrence with 
these countries was high on those issues. 
Since its defeat in World War II, Japan has promoted 
national arms control based on the provisions of its Peace 
Constitution. Its adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles and the Three Principles on Arms Control have been 
highly admired by the world community. In the 1970s, Japan 
Sweden); Yes-other 121 countries. 
105 Resolution 46/38B: No-6 (Belgium, France, Ghana, 
Netherlands, UK, USA); Abstain-31 (Albania, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Estonia, finland, Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Marshal Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Rep. of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
USSR); Yes-other 123 countries. 
102 
played a considerable role in global arms control in the 
context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and at the 
beginning of the 1980s, it began to voice concern about INF. 
However, despite a high profile on arms control and 
disarmament on the national level, Japan has not had an 
effective policy on the regional or international level. 
The discrepancy may be explained by the dichotomy within 
Japan's defense policy. Japan's unilateral arms control and 
disarmament measures, which were based on the government's 
interpretation of the Peace Constitution, have always been at 
variance with security policies deriving from the Japanese-
American security treaty. 106 
As the Government of Japan has prioritized its national 
security upon a fundamental base of international peace, 
Japan has had to depend on the United States for its security 
given the restriction of the Japanese Peace Constitution. 
This has required Japan to exert maximum efforts to maintain 
and strengthen the credibility of Japan-u.s. security 
arrangements. In realistic terms, such a national security 
policy was reasonable during the cold war and may still be 
necessary given the global uncertainties of the post-cold 
war. Security in the Asia Pacific, for example, is still 
complicated by the conflict in Korea, China's rise, and the 
unsettled politics of post-conflict Cambodia. For security in 
106 'nh d Rei ar 
Responsibilities 
1990) s. 
Drifte, Japan's Rise to International 
(Atlantic Highlands: The Athlone Press, 
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the region, the Japanese government seemingly believes 
vigilance and military ties with the United States should be 
preserved and enhanced. Without strong ties with the United 
States, Japan's relationship with all its neighbors 
including the United States would be likely to 
deteriorate. 1~ Therefore, Japan considers that there is no 
feasible alternative to working closely with the United 
States on international security issues. 
In 1980, Japan joined with the United States in the 
Systems Science and Technology Forum, which was established 
at the Pentagon's behest to usher in numerous defense 
cooperation possibilities. 1~ Japan has endorsed self-
containment policies such as an arms-exports ban and the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, but the government seems to 
exclude importing arms technology. Japan's technological 
cooperation with the U.S. may be motivated by Japan's fear of 
losing technological and commercial advantages, as well as 
its obligation within the security treaty. Security ties with 
the U.S. further strain the application of the Three 
Principles on Arms Export. In 1983, the Japanese government 
decided not to apply these principles to the United States. 
Even though the promotion of disarmament is Japan's 
1~ Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of 
Global Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 63. 
1~ Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and 
the Politics of Burden Sharing," Japan's Foreign Policy After 
the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993) 250. 
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basic policy, alliance with the United States seems to be the 
most important factor in Japan's foreign policy. To prevent 
further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons, 
Japan, as the only nation to experience the horrors of the 
atomic bomb, seems to devote its special efforts to launching 
new guidelines that strengthen the export control system on 
weapons and related items. But in reality, Japan has worked 
closely with the U.S. in drawing up the guidelines over the 
109 past years. 
In sum, the discrepancy of Japan's arms control and 
disarmament policy and its policy behavior lies in 
contradictions within Japan's defence policy. The 
contradictions stem from the security relations with the 
United States and commercial advantages. As long as Japan 
depends on the security arrangements with the U.S., it will 
continue to be heavily influenced in its foreign-policy 
behavior on international security issues, 
disarmament issues, by U.S. preferences. 
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROBLEM 
including 
Throughout the years, Japan's voting behavior on issues 
of Middle East peace was the same as that of industrialized 
countries that took a pro-Arab stance, excepting the United 
States, which supported Israel. It is no surprise that Japan, 
109 Ai Nakajima, "Tokyo seeking bigger say in global 
nuclear controls," The Nikkei Weekly, Vol.XXX, No.15, March 
28, 1992: 2. 
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as well as European countries, took pro-Arab position, since 
these states are vulnerable to reduced petroleum supplies 
from the Middle East whereas the United states is less 
vulnerable. Moreover, on Middle East issues, because Japan 
lacks a coherent foreign policy (as reviewed in Chapter II), 
it tended to follow the lead of the industrialized European 
countries. Without a concrete Middle East policy of its own, 
Japan maintained solidarity with those nations in the General 
Assembly. Thus there is no gap to fill between Japan's Middle 
East policy and its voting behavior. This section is devoted 
to a detailed examination of Japan's lack of Middle East 
policy. 
Until the oil crisis of 1973, Middle East was not among 
Japan's vital interests and the Government of Japan did not 
have a clear foreign policy toward the region. Until that 
time, Japan's Middle East policy, as well as its foreign 
policy in general, had often been criticized for being 
absolutely dependent on the United States. But the need for 
oil drove Japan to break ranks with the United States in its 
dealing with the Middle East, henceforward falling into step 
with the European community nations instead. Since 1973, 
Japan's basic policy toward the Middle East, like most 
Western countries' , has aimed at securing dependable supplies 
of oil, and it has made efforts to prevent military and 
political instability that could jeopardize these supplies. 
During the oil crisis, Japan was forced to make a 
106 
crucial decision to ensure its economic survival. The country 
was under the threat of reduction of its supply of Arab oil 
and accused of siding with Israel. Because the United States 
maintained a special alliance with Israel, Japan risked 
harming its relations with the United States by taking a pro-
Arab position. 
In October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) classified Japan as an 
"unfriendly" nation as regards the Arab cause in the fourth 
Middle East war, and announced restrictions on its members' 
crude-oil exports to Japan. 110 In November 22, 1973, the 
policy statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido Susumu 
represented Japan's first solo initiative: 1) The 
inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of any 
territories by use of force; 2) the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war; 3) 
respect for the integrity and security of the territories of 
all countries in the area and the need of guarantees to that 
end; and 4) recognition of and respect for the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and 
110 
Hiroshi Shimizu, "The Japanese Trade Contract with 
the Middle East: Lessons from the Pre-Oil Period," Japan in 
the Contemporary Middle East, ed. Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. 
Allan (New York: Routledge, 1993) 51. 
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lasting peace in the Middle East. 111 These principles were 
adopted from the U.N. resolutions. As reviewed in chapter II 
(p. 44) , Japan's current policy guideline has not changed 
since Nikaido's policy statement. On this point, Japan has 
taken a pro-Arab/anti-Israel position, contrary to the US 
stance, because for the Japanese government it seemed the 
only possible way to ensure the nation's economic survival. 
Of course Japan's decision was welcomed by the Arabs and the 
restrictions on Japanese purchases of petroleum were lifted 
• mb 112 • h in Dece er, 1973. Since t en, the Japanese government has 
offered technical and financial assistance for the economic 
development of the oil-producing states, with the main 
purpose of seeking favor from these countries for the steady 
supply of crude oil. Unlike other industrial states, because 
the Japanese government has kept itself away from political 
involvement in the region, Arab states seemed to favor 
Japanese technical and economic cooperation. 
In 1976, the PLO opened an office in Tokyo, and Arafat's 
first visit to Japan occurred in 1981. At this time, however, 
the Japanese government did not recognize the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. During 
the 1970s and early 1980s, Japan's attitudes towards Israel 
could be basically defined as cool and indifferent, and the 
111 Cited by Naramoto Eisuke, "Japan Aligned with the 




tension between Japan and the United States over the Middle 
East policy continued. Especially, Japanese compliance with 
the Arab economic boycott of Israel was a source of 
frustration for pro-Israel lobby in the United states. 
However, since U.S. friendship was vital to Japan, the 
Japanese government neither took any active role on the 
issue, nor continued to develop its Middle East policy. 
During the 1980s Japan had gradually shifted its stance 
because of a changing Middle East situation. After the second 
oil crisis of 1979, the power of Arab oil declined, and 
Japan's pro-Arab policy began to be adjusted.u3 Japan 
gradually relied less on Middle East oil, due to an oil glut 
and the increased value of the yen, as well as successful 
efforts in energy conservation and diversification of its oil 
supply. In addition, the Iran-Iraq War split the unity of 
Arabs and Iran replaced Israel as the most immediate threat 
to the region. 114 Third, Egypt opened the door to Israel. 
After Egypt had recognized the State of Israel, and 
established diplomatic ties with it, Japan as well as other 
countries, decided to deal with Israel. us For example, in 
1985, Foreign Minister of Israel Yitzhak Shamir visited 
Japan, and Prime Minister Uno made a visit to Israel in 1988. 
u3 Asai Nobuo, "Walking a Tightrope in the Middle East," 
Japan Quarterly, Vol.XXXIX, No.4, October-December 1991: 409. 
U
4 Ibid., 410. 
us Ibid. 
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After developing its relationship with Israel, Japan's 
stance in the Middle East became more ambiguous. Japan had to 
keep balanced ties with the Arabs, as well as Israel, while 
it had to maintain harmonious relations with the United 
States. 
Finally, in 1990-1991, the crisis in the Gulf deepened 
and widened the split of the united Arab front. It became 
difficult for Japan to adjust its ties in the Middle East 
among the Arab states, Israel, and Iran. Japan also had to 
consider balancing relations with the pro- and anti-Iraq 
factions with in the Arab world. 116 During the Gulf Crisis, 
Japan realized the necessity of cooperation with the United 
States. Powerful Jewish lobbies exerted increasing influence 
on the Bush Administration to put the subject of Japanese 
adherence to the Arab boycott on the agenda of u.s.-Japanese 
, 
t d t ' t' 117 I ' 1 P ' ' ' t 'f ra e nego ia ions. n Apri 1991, rime Minis er Kai u 
ended the trade embargo. Kaifu's remarks were regarded as a 
"turning point" for Japanese policy towards the region. 
Japan's rapidly changed stance also appeared in the voting 
maps in 1988 and 1991. It found it easy to expand and 
consolidate its relations with the anti-Iraq faction sided 
with the United States, and therefore it expanded ties with 
Israel, too. Japan's Middle East policy was determined the 
116 Ibid. I 415. 
117 Akifumi Ikeda, "Japan's Relations with Israel, " Japan 
in the Contemporary Middle East, ed. Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. 
Allan (New York: Routledge, 1993) 155. 
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need to have good relations with both the United States and 
oil-producing Arab states, while leaving its relationship 
with Israel. 
Maintaining stability in the region does not seem an 
easy task because of religious, ethnic, and historical 
animosities. Since World War II, the region has experienced 
six major military conflicts. Besides the Iran-Iraq War and 
the Persian Gulf War, other four wars stemmed from the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the most critical issue for regional 
stability. During the Gulf Crisis, Iraq fired scud missiles 
into Israel in an attempt to justify its invasion of Kuwait, 
but Iraq also clearly intended to provoke Israel into 
launching a counterattack that would escalate the Gulf War 
into an Arab-Israeli conflict. 118 
Japan has failed to develop much awareness of Middle 
East complexities primarily because Japan played no role in 
the historical process that preceded it: the breakup of the 
ottoman Empire and the British mandate for Palestine after 
World War I, and the establishment of Israel following World 
119 War II. Moreover, because Japan has been concerned only to 
secure access to oil, it has avoided embroilment in complex 
Arab-Israeli political issues. Finally, Japan gave up trying 
to understand the region's complexity, viewing it as one in 
118 Yoshij i Nogami, "Japan's Middle East Policy in 
Transition," Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol.VII, 
No.2, Spring 1993: 109 
119 Ibid., 109. 
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which neither Western ideology nor Japanese common sense can 
be applied to solve its problems. 1~ 
The government of Japan has made attempts to negotiate 
with the parties involved in the Middle East conflict 
(chapter II, p.45). However, the results of the meetings were 
not impressive since Japan did not have much experience in 
developing new solutions to the Palestinian problem. Nor was 
Japan comfortable about forcing its morality upon a regional 
conflict which involved totally different religions, history, 
culture, and race. Moreover, the most influential actor was 
the United States. At that point, all Japan was able to offer 
was humanitarian aid to the Palestinian refugees through the 
United Nations. 
Since the end of the cold war, the United States and 
Russia have coordinated their efforts to solve regional 
disputes arising from ethnic nationalism. In this setting, 
the United States has worked out a series of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, involving the six Gulf states, 
other Arab countries, Japan, the European Community, and 
Canada. Peace negotiation could not succeed without the 
efforts of the United States, but Japan, the EC, and Russia 
as well as Saudi Arabia helped sponsor the negotiations. 
Japan was expected to assume an active role in the 
multinational Middle East peace process that began in Moscow 
lW Tatsuo Takeda, Nihon no Gaikou: Sekkyoku Gaikou no 
Jouken (Japan's Foreign Policy: Toward Active Diplomacy> 
(Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1990) 131. 
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in January 1992 •121 It is to play a leading part in the 
environmental discussion, as well as coordinate working 
groups to cover regional arms control and security. This 
means that Japan needs to clarify its policy objectives and 
principles under all situations in the region. 
Overall, the problem in Japan's foreign-policy behavior 
on the Middle East issues lies in its lack of a clear and 
coherent foreign policy. The lack of a clear foreign policy 
seems to stem from a Japanese way of thinking, and the 
culture of the Japanese community as a whole. 122 It can be 
said that Japan's Middle East policy has been defined by its 
oil-centered economic interest. Japan's trade, foreign aid, 
and investment in the region varied directly with the price 
of oil: when oil price rose, foreign aid, investment, and 
exports to the region increased, but when prices fell in the 
1980s, Japanese perception of the strategic importance of the 
I 1 d 123 region s umpe • 
Consequently, Japan's economic contributions to regional 
peace were all Japan could do, but its political contribution 
was not significant. Since Japan is neither a military power 
nor a political power, financial contributions are Japan's 
only way to deal with the Middle East, even though the region 
121 I 1 Nogami, 12. 
122 Yuzo Itagaki, Nihonjin yo Kakuqo wa Dekiteiruka! (Are 
You Japanese Ready?) (Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 1991) 87. 
123 Lincoln, 219-220. 
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is critical to Japanese economy. Japan's policy on the Middle 
East has been determined by pressures from the United States, 
as well as oil-producing Arab states. Japan has taken an 
ambivalent position without clearly defined goals, and ended 
up simply coping with the resulting situation when a crisis 
occurred. 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
The issue of human rights, long regarded as an important 
principle regulating international relations, was raised in 
the international arena in relation to apartheid and the 
suppression of democracy by military regimes elsewhere. It 
has also been brought to bear on the repressive policies of 
certain governments (for example, Burma, China, and El 
Salvador), and it further includes problems of- international 
and internal refugees. All these human rights problems have 
been getting attention in international organizations and 
some progress on human rights has been made through their 
efforts. 
As noted in Chapter II, Japan's basic philosophy about 
human rights is that human rights are a universal value and 
are the basis for world peace and stability. In the 
Diplomatic Bluebook between 1988 and 1992, even though 
respect for human rights was expressed in general terms, 
Japan did not make any concrete policy or response to current 
human rights issues except refugee problem. It can be assumed 
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that Japan wants to avoid expressing any official statement 
on sensitive human rights issues. To justify its position, 
the Japanese government uses an excuse that "rights" develop 
within a particular culture and political system so that 
national sovereignty must be respected, which contradicts its 
basic philosophy. 1~ The government usually holds that it may 
neither set specific international human rights standards nor 
impose sanctions against violating governments. 
The United Nations, during the five years studied here, 
addressed human rights problems directly through a series of 
resolutions passed by the General Assembly. Japan's voting 
behavior on these issues in the Forty-Third Session might be 
interpreted as a sign of reluctance to make any decisions. 
Without exception, Japan abstained from human rights 
questions such as: "rights of peoples to peace, 11125 which 
reaffirmed that the implementation of the right of peoples to 
peace constitutes a fundamental concern of each state; 
"international decade for the eradication of 
colonialism, 11126 which declared the period 1990-2 000 as the 
1~ John M. Peek, "Japan, the United Nations, and Human 
Rights," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXII, No.3, March 1992: 222. 
1~ Resolution 43/22: No-o; Abstain-29 (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Djibouti, Fiji, 
Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, 
USA); Yes-other 118 countries. 
126 Resolution 43/47: No-1 (USA); Abstain-20 (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, france, West Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
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International Decade for Eradication of Colonialism, aiming 
at a world free from colonialism; "human rights and 
scientific and technological developments, 11127 which stressed 
the importance of the implementation by all states of the 
provisions and principles contained in the Declaration on the 
Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests 
of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind in order to promote 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; "indivisibility and 
interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil, and 
political rights, 11128 which requested the Secretary-General 
to enhance his efforts under the programme of advisory 
services to states in the implementation, promotion, and 
protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set 
forth in the International Covenants on Human Rights and 
other United Nations instruments in the field of human 
rights; and many aspects of apartheid issues. Japan continued 
its silence on human rights issues in the Forty-sixth 
Session. 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK); Yes-other 
135 countries. 
127 Resolution 43/110: No-o; Abstain-24 {Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA); Yes-other 133 countries. 
128 Resolution 43/113: No-1 {USA); Abstain-23 {Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK); Yes-other 132 countries. 
116 
Also on human rights issues, the Japanese government 
found great difficulty maintaining a dual stance that takes 
account of its membership in both the Western camp and the 
Asian community. Japan was faced with the prospect of 
choosing between positions defined on the one hand by the 
governments of the advanced West and various international 
and non-governmental organizations, and on the other hand, by 
the governments of Asian countries such as Indonesia, China, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. Western nations prioritize economic 
liberalization, democratization, human rights, and 
environmental preservation, and believe that any violations 
against those values should be punished until corrected. For 
those countries, the universalization of democratic values is 
important. On the contrary, some Asian countries claim that 
Western liberalism, including democratization and human 
rights, detracts from their economic growth and political 
stability. In this respect, Japan has found itself in an 
awkward position in which it cannot take sides. As a result, 
Japan wound up abstaining on most of human rights issues. 
Yet Japan has been very sensitive to human rights issues 
in Asia, notably China's suppression of political and human 
rights. After the Tiananmen suppression of 1989, Japan 
initially joined the West in condemning the actions by the 
Chinese government. However, the Japanese government became 
the first to lift its economic sanctions against the Chinese 
Communist regime. It was the first to provide, initially in 
117 
private, then publicly, multiple loans to the Chinese 
government, and the first to send an official at the 
ministerial level to visit Beijing. 129 In January 1991, 
Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited China and Prime 
Minister Kaifu visited Beijing in August 1991. Prime Minister 
Miyazawa, who succeeded Kaifu, supported Prime Minister Li 
Peng of China and justified Japan's response: "Some countries 
may have pulled themselves out of absolute poverty, and for 
them, making a living is the most important for that country. 
Applying an abstract yardstick of human rights to foreign aid 
would not allow for effective development assistance. 11130 
This tendency can be seen Japan's reaction elsewhere in 
Asia. For example, when Burma's military seized power and 
killed hundreds of student protesters demanding 
democratization in September 1988, Japan followed the West in 
suspending aid but it never linked this action to the 
ruthless behavior of the Burmese military. Then in February 
1989, Japan broke with the West and resumed economic aid for 
continuing projects as well as humanitarian aid. 
On November 12, 1991, over 100 unarmed pro-independence 
East Timor demonstrators were killed in the town of Dili by 
Indonesian security forces. The Japanese government requested 
that Jakarta thoroughly investigate the case. Japan welcomed 
129 Liu Binyan, "Human Rights Imperialism and Self-
Determination in Asia," New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol.IX, 
No.1, Winter 1992: 31. 
130 Cited by Liu Binyan, 31-32. 
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Indonesia's report of the investigation, including penalties 
for Army commanders. 131 Although 262 Japanese Diet members 
petitioned the Miyazawa government to review its aid policies 
toward Indonesia, the Japanese government stated that there 
d t h . t . 1 ' ' 
132 L 'k was no nee o c ange economic coopera ion po icies. i e 
most other G-7 countries, Japan did not suspend aid or visits 
by government officials. 
In Thailand, the elected government headed by Chatichai 
Choonhaven was toppled in February 1991 by a bloodless 
military coup. Western nations condemned the action and 
threatened aid stoppages and economic sanctions, but Japan 
noted a mere expression of regret and its intention not to 
consider changing ODA implementation. 133 Later, on May 18, 
1992, the military government under General Suchinda 
Krapayoon declared an emergency in Bangkok, and army crushed 
a mass demonstration calling for an end of military rule, 
reportedly killing more than 100 people. At first, Japan did 
not condemn the bloodshed, only demanding that Thailand 
restore stability. The Japanese government did not suspend 
aid in the response to the situation while the U.S. suspended 
scheduled talks on resumption of already frozen aid and 
131 • k . " d . 1 Hisao Ta agi, Japan pursues own ip omacy on 
international human rights," The Nikkei Weekly, Vol.XXX, 
No.1528, August 1, 1992: 1-2. 
132 David Arase, "Japanese Policy Toward Democracy and 
Human Rights in Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 10, 
October 1993: 947. 
133 Ibid., 948. 
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canceled a joint military drill. 
As reviewed in chapter II, Japan's aid policies are 
supposed to be based on humanitarian considerations. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government's reactions to 
violation of human rights in Asia seems to contradict its aid 
policy guidelines and indicated its political difficulty in 
following collective actions undertaken by Western nations. 
Japan's idealistic statements share a common view and basic 
policy with Western nations on human rights issues. Its 
reluctance to follow the Western philosophy on human rights 
has been justified by claiming that Japan's economic aid to 
Asian countries does not mean that Japan harbors a disrespect 
for human rights; only that Japan has a different approach. 
In practice, Japan's policy emphasis on economic development 
in Asia contrasts with Western priorities such as 
democratization, human rights, and environmental 
preservation. A former Japanese ambassador to the United 
Nations, Shizue Saito, has stated that "applying a 
formalistic response to a country like China, however, would 
only complicate matters, not only because of its vast size 
but also because such measures could have serious 
international political repercussions. 11134 He implied support 
of China's counterattack to the U.S. , claiming that U.S. 
pressure on China's human rights violation was interference 
134 Shizue Saito, "The United Nations and the Issues of 
a Fluid Global Society," Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.VII, No.3, Summer 1993: 241. 
120 
in domestic affairs. Takakazu Kuriyama, a former vice foreign 
minister, said that "its (Japan's] approaches to human rights 
do not have to be identical to those of Washington, 
especially as our historical relations with Asian nations are 
different from those of the U.S. Some nations like China have 
a very idiosyncratic concept of human rights, and we have to 
135 understand that." 
There are cultural and political constraints on the 
promotion of human rights in Japan. While there is a 
tradition of promoting citizens' rights, the concept of human 
rights is at best fuzzy among the public, which often 
associates human-rights activities with charity and voluntary 
work rather than political dissent and racial 
discrimination. 1~ Further, because of its wartime atrocities 
in Korea, China, and Southeast Asia, Japan feels that it is 
on weak moral ground when accusing its neighbors of human-
I ht I 1 t' 137 rig s vio a ions. Japanese criticism of other Asian 
countries because of their human rights policies provokes 
suspicion of Japanese motives and leads to fears of a revival 
of prewar Japanese expansionism. Therefore, Japan often gives 
priority to maintaining good political relations with other 
135 Cited by Hisao Takagi in "Similar ends, different 
means," The Nikkei Weekly, Vol. 29. No.1495, December 7, 1991: 
2. 
1~ Louise do Rosario, "Reluctant Convert: Tokyo Begins 
to Speak up on Human rights," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. 153, No.34, August 22, 1991: 14-15. 
ln Ibid. 
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Asian nations over protection of individual human rights. 
Because of the socio-cultural and political factors, 
Japan has difficulties implementing its policy on human 
rights issues. Therefore it continues to abstain from the 
issue, and relies instead on influencing human rights 
policies through bilateral and multilateral humanitarian aid. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The economic contribution to developing countries by the 
Government of Japan has been noteworthy. For Japan, the term 
"foreign aid" is closely linked to economic development. 
Whenever the Japanese government talks about economic 
development in developing countries, without exception it 
assumes foreign aid is the true subject under discussion. As 
Japan has named expanding and enhancing its ODA to the 
developing countries as one of the three pillars of the 
International Cooperation Initiative, Japan has been 
increasing its ODA disbursement. In 1989, it became the 
world's largest donor of ODA. In addition, Japan has worked 
on the solution for the accumulated debt problem in 
developing countries, introduced a financial recycling 
scheme, and announced the Fourth Medium-Term Target of ODA. 
Although the quantity of its economic assistance has 
been impressive, its quality and marked inclination towards 
Asia have become a question. To improve the quality, Japan 
introduced a country-by-country assistance plan so as to take 
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into account requests made on a bilateral basis. In addition, 
Japan has been emphasizing grants and technical assistance 
over soft loans, and strengthening the administration of aid 
by training more experts to ensure the effective use of 
Japanese assistance. Yet the problem of regional inclination 
has not been solved, although Japanese government has 
gradually increased the proportion of its aid extended to 
non-Asian countries. In the ODA Charter in 1992, however, the 
Japanese government asserted that its economic assistance to 
Asia would continue to be its top priority. 
Japan's voting behavior on these issues mostly reflected 
its basic policy that the steady economic development of the 
developing countries is of extreme importance to world peace 
and stability. Supporting the self-help efforts of developing 
countries facing a vicious circle of poverty is regarded by 
Tokyo as a responsibility of a major economic power. In the 
Forty-Third Session, Japan tended to vote in favor of 
proposals for economic development for developing countries. 
However, it abstained on a propose for a "durable solution 
for the debt crisis .. 138 I which called on the international 
community to continue searching for durable, equitable, and 
mutually agreed growth oriented and development-oriented 
solution to the external indebtedness of developing 
countries, while the United States voted against it. The 
138 Resolution 43/198: No-1 (USA); Abstain-1 (Japan); 
Yes-other 150 countries. 
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voting records also reveal that Japan affirmed resolutions 
related to economic development while the United States 
abstained. Again it seems to have been U.S. influence on 
Japan's voting behavior even on issues of economic 
development. Another remark in the voting maps is that 
Japan's concurrence with other industrial countries, 
especially G-7 countries, on these issues was very high. 
In the Forty-Sixth Session, most proposals concerning 
economic development were adopted without votes. It meant 
that all nations expressed a willingness to cooperate to 
solve the global economic problem. Only two resolutions 
related to economic development -- that of "economic measures 
as a means of political and economic coercion against 
developing countries, 11139 which called upon the international 
community to adopt urgent and effective measures to eliminate 
the use by some developed countries of unilateral economic 
coercive measuring against developing countries, and 
"progressive development of the principles and norms of 
international law related to the new international economic 
1~ Resolution 46/210: No-31 (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, DPR Korea, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA); Abstain-a 
(Albania, Argentina, Greece, Panama, Rep. of Korea, Spain, 
Ukraine, USSR); Yes-other 97 countries. 
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order, 11140 which called upon the United Nations to initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of 
encouraging the progressive development of international law 
and its consideration -- were rejected by both Japan and the 
United States as well as other industrial nations. 
Overall Japan's foreign policy on issues of economic 
development is positive and it was reflected by its voting 
behavior. Its aid policy is considered to be gaining wide 
support both at home and abroad and portrayed as one matching 
its national and international interests. In other words, 
there were no domestic or external constraints that might 
hinder Japanese foreign policy on these issues. At home, most 
Japanese groups, including labor unions, the media, 
intellectuals, the business community, and all political 
parties, support foreign economic assistance. International 
and multinational organizations appreciate Japan's readiness 
to make up for American hesitation on increased multilateral 
aid since the early 1980s. 141 All recipient countries welcome 
Japan's efforts. At the same time, it works as an effective 
140 Resolution 46/52: No-20 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA); Abstain-17 (Albania, 
Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Panama, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, TUrkey, Ukraine, USSR); Yes-other 117 
countries. 
141 Dennis T. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'Aid Great 
Power'," Pacific Affairs, Vol.LXII, No.4, Winter 1989-90: 
501. 
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diplomatic tool from Tokyo's perspective. Aid serves as one 
means of restoring the severed relations with Asian nations 
conquered by Japan. 
Although the Japanese government's official motive for 
aid is to form a bridge between North and South, the critical 
motivation is focused on securing raw material imports to 
protect national economic well-being. After the oil crisis of 
1973, foreign· aid has served as a major lubricant keeping the 
flow of oil to Japan, and it is a useful bargaining tool in 
relations with Persian Gulf combatants and their allies. 142 
Not only oil producing countries, but all the major 
recipients of foreign aid are major sources of raw 
materials. 1~ Lacking the possibility of using military force 
as a backup for protecting economic security, Japanese 
foreign aid gained increased importance as an economic 
security policy. 
In addition, recently Japan has used foreign aid for 
more overtly international political or strategic purposes, 
such as when the Government of Japan announced new guidelines 
of foreign aid in 1992 (chapter II, pp.53-54). Although some 
of these guidelines, such as the degree of progress on 
democratization in respect for human rights, seem difficult 
to implement (see the discussion in the previous section of 
human rights issues), foreign aid could contribute to global 
W
2 Ibid., 500. 
w3 Lincoln, 116. 
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peace and stability if the Government of Japan strictly and 
constantly applies the guidelines. So far its application of 
the guidelines to foreign aid is ambiguous and inconsistent. 
The government could not force the policy since about six out 
of the top ten recipients of bilateral aid (Bangladesh, 
China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand) could 
not meet the guidelines. 144 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
As reviewed in chapter II, Japan's foreign policy on 
environmental issues is newly developed. The efforts to 
define an active role in international environmental policy 
began around 1988, when a spokesman for the Environmental 
Agency advanced the notion that the government could play a 
role in assisting developing countries with their 
environmental problems and complained of the government's 
145 lack of any long-term strategy to do so. The June 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro provided Japan a forum to 
respond to the global scope of environmental concerns. 
In the Forty-Third and Forty-Sixth Sessions, most of 
issues related to environment were adopted without votes. 
Japan's voting behavior on the environment was very positive. 
Japan affirmed every environmentally related issue, such as 
144 Ibid. I 119. 
145 Kazuo Matsushita, "Japan Offers Negative-Positive 
Ecological Model," Japan Economic Journal, Vol.XXVI, No.1321, 
July 16, 1988: 23 
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"climate effects of nuclear war, 11146 which examined the 
report of the Secretary-General about a study on the climatic 
and potential physical effects of nuclear war, and 
"international cooperation to mitigate the environmental 
consequences in Kuwait and other countries in the region 
resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 11147 
which emphasized the need to continue to take comprehensive 
measures to study and mitigate these environmental 
consequences in the region within a framework of sustained 
and coordinated international cooperation. 
On environmental matters, Japan's voting behavior is 
affected largely by its foreign policy and there seem to be 
few domestic and international objections to promoting 
international environmental protection. Internationally, all 
major nations are dealing with environmental problems very 
positively, according to the voting records. At home, the 
Government and corporations have cooperated to improve global 
environment. 
As an usual strategy, Japan foreign aid quickly became 
a central part of emerging environmental policy. At the 
annual industrial-nation economic summit meeting in 1988, the 
Japanese government committed itself at the annual 
146 Resolution 43/780: No-0; Abstain-9 (Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK, USA); Yes-
other 145 countries. 
1~ Resolution 46/216: No-o; Abstain-1 (Iraq); Yes-other 
135 countries. 
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industrial-nation economic summit meeting in 1988 to a three-
year, $2.2 billion environmental foreign aid program. In June 
1992, the prolonged Diet deliberation in Tokyo on the bill to 
enable Japanese troops to be dispatched overseas prevented 
Prime Minister Miyazawa from attending the Earth summit, for 
which he was criticized. But that did not prevent Miyazawa•s 
representatives from announcing Japan's contributions. 
Miyazawa announced Japan's decision to expand environmental 
aid to around $7 billion to $7.7 billion over a period of 
f . b . . . 148 ive years eginning in 1992. 
Along with purely financial aid, the Japanese government 
has been actively involved with funding and providing 
administrative guidance in a number of interesting and 
significant technological fields. These include 
internationally recognized progress on fuel cell technology, 
selective catalytic reduction for electric power plants, 
fluidized bed combustion, coal liquefaction, combined cycle 
powerplants, automobile efficiency, and solar photovoltaic 
149 cells. 
Yet as with other issues, Japan has to face the 
criticism that Japan lacks a global environmental 
consciousness, and had to be forced to eventually take any 
international initiative. The government often seeks to meet 
148 "Tokyo commits to 5-year 
environmental protection," The Nikkei 
No.1522, June 20, 1992: 2. 
149 • 1 Linea n, 153. 
aid package for 
Weekly, Vol.XXX, 
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these criticism with a burst of enthusiasm. Prime Minister 
Takeshita in 1989 told Environmental Agency officials that 
"we cannot meet the burden-sharing demand on the military 
front but we should in the area of environmental 
t
. 11 1so preserva ion. One government official's analysis of 
Takeshita' s "Save the Earth" interest was that it stemmed 
from a belief that Japan must take the initiative in a sphere 
that lacks a clear leader, and where Japan can use its new 
wealth and technological prowess to aid the global quality of 
1 . f 151 l. e. 
In addition to the government's positive attitude 
towards global environment problems, Japanese corporations 
have been making efforts towards further technological 
development. They have expressed views favoring government 
controls on the environment which can prevent the problem of 
f 'd 152 ree-ri e. 
Although Japan's foreign policy and its foreign-policy 
behavior have been active regarding the preservation of the 
environment since 1989, there are global disagreements which 
might curb Japan's efforts. There is widespread skepticism in 
Japan and abroad about whether the initiative is more style 
15° Cited by Katsuro Ki tamatsu in " 'Save the Earth' 
initiative launched," The Japan Economic Journal, Vol.XXVII, 
No.1361, April 29, 1989: 1. 
151 Ibid. 
152 "A Panel Discussion of Environmental Issues and 
Japanese Policy," Japan 21st, Vol.XXXVIII, No.6, June 1993: 
63-68. 
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than substance because many critics feel took Japan too long 
to show its interest in taking up its environmental 
responsibilities. Some developing countries believe that 
economic development is their first priority, rather than 
preservation of the environment. Even among industrial 
countries, there are disagreements about approaches to the 
issues. On one hand, France, the Netherlands, and Norway are 
urging that industrial nations uniformly cut domestic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and introduce punitive measures 
to achieve that goal. On the other hand, the United States 
and Japan have countered that simple regulations would be 
counterproductive to industrial activities. 
Moreover, Japan is often criticized for its extensive 
use of tropical timber and its attitudes toward resource 
conservation. Japan heavily depends on natural resources 
imported from foreign countries. Any solution would require 
changes in Japanese lifestyle. 
There is a world-wide trend not to sacrifice economic 
development for environmental protection, despite the United 
nations' adoption of a "sustainable development" model. Yet 
most nations want to reduce the undesirable (and costly) 
environmental consequences of economic development. Japan is 
a leader in environmental and/or energy-saving technology 
which can be used to help countries who are seriously 
suffering from both security and economic threats caused by 
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deforestation, desetification, and acid rain. 153 Japan 
experienced environmental disasters in the 1960s caused by 
rapid industrial growth. Since then Japan has continued 
environmental efforts on industrial pollution control and it 
has established a remarkable record in combining substantial 
improvements in its domestic environment with unprecedented 
levels of economic growth. 154 The economic development 
achieved by some Asian countries during the 1980s left a 
similar record as that of Japan in the 1960s. Japanese 
expertise in industrial pollution control is of use to its 
neighbors efforts of environmental protection in the region. 
Since environmental measures require extra cost, the 
governments of some rapidly industrializing countries in Asia 
give lower priority to environmental protection. The best 
available technologies of the advanced industrialized world 
are not economically feasible for most developing countries. 
In this respect, Japan could provide the appropriate 
technologies and use foreign aid policy to influence these 
governments to regulate environmental policy at home. 
In sum, Japan's technological advantage, along with its 
financial clout, might make it possible to establish 
sustainable development. There has been a tremendous amount 
153 Taizo Yakushij i, "Technology and the Setting for 
Japan's Agenda," Japan's International Agenda, ed. Youichi 
Funabashi (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 78-79. 
154 Hidefumi Imura, "Japan's Environmental Balancing 
Act," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, April 1994: 359. 
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of willingness and effort devoted to the problem by the 
Japanese government that cannot be ignored. Given Japanese 
economic power and technological sophistication, Japan can be 
a leading nation on the environmental front. 
However, for global environmental problems such as 
climate changes, collective and cooperative actions by 
governments and industries are indispensable. Whether Japan 
can succeed of this depends on global consensus and Japanese 
leadership. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: THEORY OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN-POLICY BEHAVIOR 
This study has explored factors that influence Japan's 
foreign-policy behavior issue by issue. The gap between 
official foreign policy guidelines and its foreign-policy 
behavior stems from either an overly idealistic policy or 
lack of independent policy, such as those issues related to 
Japan's security ties with the United States, economic 
relations with the Middle East, and historical relationships 
with other Asian countries. In this concluding chapter, I 
clarify the findings with a theoretical consideration. 
POWER AND INFLUENCE 
Influence is the ability to affect the behavior of 
others; it is the most relational aspect of power. Influence 
involves actually changing others' implementation of foreign 
policy, including making them switch voting positions in the 
United Nations. Influence may involve encouraging others to 
continue current behavior. As instruments of influence, 
states may use diplomatic, military, economic, and 
psychological methods. 
The tools of influence very much depend on a state's 
capabilities and how those capabilities stand in relation to 
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the capabilities of others. During the cold war, power was 
measured by military capability. As the superpowers declined, 
many political scientists redefined power. For example, 
Joseph s. Nye, Jr. emphasized "soft power," and notes: 
Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength 
in war. Today, however, the definition of power is 
losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that 
marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, 
education, and economic growth are becoming more 
significant in international power, while geography, 
population{ and raw materials are becoming somewhat less 
• t t SS imper an • 
Hanns W. Maull introduced the concept of "civilian power," 
which is a non-military, primarily economic, means to secure 
national goals, with military power left as a residual 
instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of 
international interaction. 1~ Thus we have seen the multi-
dimensionality of power. 
Influence Based on Military Power 
The multi-dimensionality of power, however, does not 
depreciate military power. It implies that military 
capability itself still represents an aspect of power but 
that other capabilities, such as the economy, and technology, 
are becoming increasingly important. The Gulf Crisis proved 
the continuing relevance of military power, as well as the 
iss Joseph s. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, 
No.SO, Fall 1990: 154. 
156 Hanns w. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian 
Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol.69, No.5, Winter 1990/91: 92. 
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necessity of economic resources to resolve international 
crises. As long as international conflicts continue, military 
power seems unlikely to be replaced by soft power alone. The 
military dimension is still a central aspect of the 
capabilities of states. 
Throughout history, military capabilities have been the 
most influential factor determining a state's behavior. 
Although the use of military capabilities is generally a 
coercive or punishment-oriented means of influence, they 
could be used to influence others by rewarding others. 
Russett and Starr note two way to influence states by 
rewarding them with military capabilities. States may attempt 
to influence commitment to an alliance, U.N. voting, or 
general political orientation by extending military aid. 157 
Or states may influence others by promising to add to their 
capabilities, which is a main feature of alliances. 158 The 
latter is indicative of Japan's situation. Given the Peace 
Constitution and the security treaty with the United States, 
Japan has maintained its pacifist positions, and has relied 
on the United States on security matters. Therefore, the 
United States has exerted a crucial influence upon Japan's 
foreign-policy behavior, including U.N. voting. 
As revealed in the previous chapter, this influence, 
based on the military power of the United States, was 
151 Russett and Starr, 166. 
lSS Ibid. 
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significant on issues of arms control and disarmament, and 
economic development in developing countries. To a lesser 
degree, Japan was also influenced by the United States on 
Middle East issues and human rights issues. 
Influence Based on Economic Resources 
States rely on each other for resources and commodities 
that enable them to develop and sustain their economies and 
the well-being of their peoples. 159 This reliance is central 
to the ideas of leverage and vulnerability. Economic 
resources can be manipulated by those who possess them to 
influence those who do not. Economic resources can be used to 
the same ends as military capability. Negatively, states may 
take away, threaten to cut off, or fail to provide another 
with some economic resource, commodity, or service. 
The Arab states have used their oil resources to affect 
the West. They control such a large portion of the oil supply 
that finding alternative sources of petroleum is difficult. 
Japan, because of its lack of energy resources, has relied on 
supplies from other countries. Especially, its oil reliance 
on the Arab states has made Japan vulnerable to economic 
threats. After the oil crisis of 1973, even though Japan has 
devoted itself to developing the technology for energy 
efficient products, and diversifying its sources of oil and 
other energy supplies, the Arab states are still crucial to 
159 Ibid. I 17 5 • 
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Japan. Its economy remains very vulnerable. 
Japan, as well as European countries, has been 
influenced by the Arab states. The Arab states do not exert 
the same influence upon the United states because of its 
petroleum reserves; but these reserves are not sufficient to 
supply the needs of the other Western countries. This reality 
is reflected in the voting maps. Japan and the European 
countries always took a pro-Arab stance on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and Palestinian refugee problem, while 
the United states kept a pro-Israel position. 
Similarly, Japan depends heavily on imported natural 
resources from Asian countries. However, the influence 
exerted by Asian states through their supplies of natural 
resources cannot compare with that of the Arab states, since 
Japan also uses foreign investment, technological transfer, 
and economic aid to counterbalance Asian states' resources. 
This economic interdependence makes Japan less vulnerable. 
Influence Based on Psychological constraints 
In another way, states may use psychological techniques 
to exercise influence. 
Japan's historical experience with other Asian countries 
is the source of yet another of Japan's vulnerabilities. The 
historical legacy of Japanese expansionism in the pre-war era 
is one of Japanese exploitation of the wealth and resources 
of its neighbors in order to expand Japan's growing empire. 
Japan dealt most cruelly with the peoples of Asia. These 
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experiences have created a lasting bitterness among Asians 
toward Japan. Moreover, the Japanese themselves were to 
experience a moral and psychological trauma arising from 
their own past. Popular emotion among Asians against Japan 
still functions as an important determinant in regional 
relations. 160 Whenever difficult issues arise in bilateral 
relations, such as the trade imbalance, questions of new 
guidelines for aid, and violation of human rights, the 
emotional legacy looms up to strain negotiations. 
This historical constraint can be observed in Japan's 
voting behavior on human rights issues. Japan's · frequent 
abstention from sensitive human rights issues is nothing but 
a manifestation of the lasting influence of the wartime 
legacy upon relations between Japan and other Asian 
countries. And as noted before, it also affects Japan's 
implementation of the new guidelines for foreign aid. 
A LACK OF COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY 
It is obvious that before it can implement a foreign 
policy, a government needs to have one. Foreign policy has a 
crucial role to perform in the international affairs. It is 
necessary for governments to organize general structures 
which make their international activities at least compatible 
160 Masahide Shibusawa, Zakaria Haji Ahmad, and Brian 
Bridges, Pacific Asia in the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 
1992) 137. 
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with their core interests. 161 Simply, ambiguous government 
policies do not help states to take any international 
actions. 
Japan has held an idealistic set of guidelines on many 
international issues and its application of foreign policy is 
inconsistent. The inconsistency stems from Japan's belief 
that each nation-state has different values, cultures, and 
traditions, therefore it is not appropriate to deal with 
nation-states in a single-minded fashion. This respect for 
cultural relativity could be seen in Japan's attitude toward 
human rights issues, the Middle East peace problem, and 
environmental issues, to some extent. Similarly, Japan's 
ambivalent stance of advocating cooperation with everybody 
makes it difficult to take a coherent policy. 
Given its too general official guidelines and its 
priority of cooperation with everybody, Japan uses the 
international framework and diplomacy to determine its 
behavior toward international issues. Diplomacy is the 
preferred political technique, because it involves direct 
government to government interactions. Today much activity 
occurs in multilateral forums. Especially, since Japan has 
not been involved in any international political framework 
except the G-7, Japan has used the summits to coordinate its 
foreign policy. Thus voting maps shows Japan's high 
161 Steve Smith and Michael Clarke, Foreign Policy 
Implementation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) 179. 
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concurrence with G-7 members. 
A FINAL WORD 
In chanqinq international environment and because of its 
economic power, Japan has been expected to exercise a more 
active diplomacy. However, currently Japan's performance 
remains much as it has been. Its foreiqn policy remains 
ambiquous and idealistic. Its foreiqn-policy behavior does 
not reflect its policy. Without a coherent and concrete 
foreign policy, Japan ends up displaying ambivalent behavior, 
and covers up its inaction with foreiqn aid. This study 
demonstrates that on selective international issues the 
discrepancy between its foreign policy and foreign-policy 
behavior stems largely from external military, economic, and 
cultural influence. Japan's foreign-policy behavior on arms 
control and disarmament issue is mostly influenced by the 
military power of the United States. On economic development 
in developinq countries it is influenced by the economic 
resources of developinq nations, and particularly in Asia by 
historical constraints. Japan's behavior on human riqhts 
issue is constrained by the socio-cultural and political 
factors related to its cloudy relations with its neiqhbors. 
On the Middle East peace problem, its behavior is affected by 
the economic resources of the reqion, and relations with the 
United States. Further, Japan's lack of coherent and concrete 
foreign policy creates delayed reactions to international 
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crises, inconsistency in implementing foreign policy, and 
dependency on the United States or other G-7 members. Only on 
global environmental issues, where there are no significant 
influential factors to constrain Japan's foreign-policy 
behavior, given its technological and financial capability, 
it is possible to be a leading state as the Government of 
Japan wishes. 
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APPENDIX A 
FACTOR SCORES BY COUNTRY OF THE 43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
COUNTRIES FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 
Afghanistan .301 -.093 .119 -.046 
Albania 2.250 .062 -.492 -.938 
Algeria .376 .093 .373 -.118 
Angola .259 -.087 .492 .324 
Antigua & Barbuda .372 -.076 .035 -.134 
Argentina .376 .095 .043 .129 
Australia -2.477 .193 1.265 -.321 
Austria -2.872 .042 2.503 -.047 
Bahamas .453 -.135 -.031 2.459 
Bahrain .408 .025 .292 -.052 
Bangladesh .408 -.063 .143 .285 
Barbados .403 -.144 .190 -.106 
Belgium -2.080 .550 -3.206 .532 
Belize .938 -.363 -.742 2.241 
Benin .272 -.065 -.232 -.083 
Bhutan .196 -.074 -.010 -.166 
Bolivia .356 -.015 -.214 -.264 
Botswana .452 .068 .039 -.123 
Brazil .281 .246 .581 -.367 
Brunei Darussalam .562 -.045 .133 -.095 
Bulgaria .354 -.117 -.207 -.055 
Burkina Faso .360 -.065 .005 -.111 
Burundi .372 -.005 .022 -.129 
Byelorussian SSR .380 -.087 -.194 -.123 
Cambodia 1.198 -.189 .066 -.703 
Cameroon .520 -.323 -.445 -.567 
Canada -2.133 .630 -.526 -.051 
Cape Verde .263 -.064 .028 .183 
Central Africa Rep. .306 .014 .156 -.054 
Chad .408 .025 -.208 -.078 
Chili -.087 -.122 -.729 -.478 
China .464 .012 -.117 .379 
Colombia .196 .029 -.310 -.326 
Comoros .450 .006 -.362 .472 
Congo .196 3.221 -.709 -1. 030 
Costa Rica .590 .252 -.193 .078 
Ivory Coast .227 -.395 .516 .111 
Cuba .434 .150 .391 -.079 
Cyprus .195 -.080 .440 .286 
Czechoslovakia .380 -.089 -.194 -.123 
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Denmark -2.973 .317 1.200 -.042 
Djibouti .622 .050 -.020 -.087 
Dominica .371 2.768 2.731 2.250 
Dominica Republic .018 -.018 -.291 -.372 
Ecuador .368 .012 -.046 -.062 
Egypt .447 .107 .197 -.071 
El Salvador .077 -.275 .110 .275 
Equatorial Guinea .321 3.354 3.218 -.294 
Ethiopia .387 -.042 .265 -.088 
Fiji -.167 -.046 .288 .039 
Finland -2.710 .074 2.348 -.082 
France -1. 775 .512 -2.358 .099 
Gabon .534 .025 -.257 -.248 
Gambia .257 -.046 -.234 .103 
Germany Dem. Rep. .446 -.086 -.226 -.140 
Germany (Fed. Rep.) -1. 686 .933 -2.839 .701 
Ghana .446 .072 -.041 -.071 
Greece -2.761 .074 1.644 -.249 
Grenada .756 -.373 3.479 -.498 
Guatemala .562 -.064 -.494 1.982 
Guinea .358 -.116 -.064 .213 
Guinea-Bissau .611 -.295 3.817 .598 
Guyana .361 -.032 .106 -.066 
Haiti .676 -.051 -.265 -.030 
Honduras .182 -.085 -.049 -.171 
Hungary .464 -.093 -.246 .511 
Iceland -2.927 .730 .783 -.004 
India .299 -.033 .269 -.003 
Indonesia .388 .045 .170 -.109 
Iran .409 .052 .009 -.197 
Iraq .398 .078 .325 -.111 
Ireland -2.890 .219 2.001 .014 
Israel -1.782 -8.603 .078 5.214 
Italy -1.864 .439 -2.901 .416 
Jamaica .109 -.438 .846 -.003 
Japan -2.381 .594 -.402 -1. 522 
Jordan .390 .037 .200 -.101 
Kenya .319 .011 .013 -.066 
Kuwait .357 .033 -.108 -.160 
Laos .443 -.069 -.129 -.126 
Lebanon .595 -.043 -.467 -.101 
Lesotho .240 .077 .381 -.017 
Liberia .399 -2.431 .681 .313 
Libya .384 .048 .207 -.152 
Luxembourg -1.834 .622 -3.100 .261 
Madagascar .371 .026 .079 -.091 
Malawi .378 .229 .375 .078 
Malaysia .331 -.045 -.373 -.174 
Maldives .312 .096 .083 .144 
Mali .369 -.153 -.033 -.059 
Malta -.543 .023 .795 -.327 
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Mauritania .425 -.093 -.586 -.394 
Mauritius .568 -.058 -.521 -.219 
Mexico .351 .013 .052 -.108 
Mongolia .451 -.103 .073 -.193 
Morocco .291 -.227 -.318 .517 
Mozambique .212 -.178 -.281 -.041 
Myanmar .452 .226 .244 -.223 
Nepal .405 .039 .077 -.110 
Netherlands -1.997 .592 -3.152 .511 
New Zealand -2.308 .246 1.574 -.086 
Nicaragua .409 .018 .161 -.103 
Niger .441 .079 .001 .028 
Nigeria .353 -.012 .021 -.123 
Norway -2.798 .326 1.157 -.204 
Omen .839 .114 -.381 -.122 
Pakistan .346 .080 .207 -.032 
Panama .359 .258 -.010 -.222 
Papua New Guinea .234 -.016 -.092 .298 
Paraguay 1.446 -.204 -1.321 -.315 
Peru .364 -.019 -.070 -.136 
Philippines .276 -.058 .164 -.068 
Poland .404 -.103 -.343 .348 
Portugal -1.764 .664 -2.251 .060 
Qatar .401 -.133 -.211 -.241 
Romania .260 -.051 -.020 -.122 
Rwanda .379 .014 -.171 -.184 
St. Kitts & Nevis .530 -.390 -1.227 2.023 
st. Lucia .514 -.058 -.298 2.320 
st. Vincent-Grenadines .584 .104 .141 -.072 
Samoa .152 .116 .092 .055 
Sao Tome and Principe .599 -.253 -.979 -.349 
Saudi Arabia .443 .064 .138 -.090 
Senegal .266 .016 -.105 -.083 
Seychelles .379 .004 -.231 -.130 
Sierra Leone .459 -.012 -.184 -.016 
Singapore .613 -.193 .011 -.418 
Solomon Islands .355 -.019 -.095 .310 
Somalia .347 -.011 .078 -.146 
Spain -2.826 .286 -.563 -.196 
Sri Lanka .407 -.091 -.283 -.113 
Sudan .379 .076 .344 -.085 
Suriname .290 3.227 -.714 -.547 
Swaziland .331 .225 -.029 .123 
Sweden -2.770 .127 2.416 -.084 
Syrian Arab Rep. .331 .039 .116 .112 
Tanzania .359 -.113 .077 -.095 
Thailand .538 .222 .193 -.188 
Togo .323 -.059 -.168 -.175 
Trinidad and .393 -.010 -.072 -.127 
Tunisia .387 .028 -.053 -.159 
Turkey -1.391 .270 -1.979 -.047 
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Uganda .439 .230 -.005 -.051 
Ukrainian SSR .380 -.087 -.194 -.123 
United Arab Emirates .380 -.087 -.194 -.123 
United Kingdom -1.516 1.144 -1. 318 1.741 
United States -.920 -4.940 -.784 -9.216 
USSR .419 -.032 -.225 -.127 
Uruguay .167 .003 -.122 -.026 
Vanuatu .458 -.404 -.124 .412 
Venezuela .208 .067 .149 -.006 
Viet Nam .362 -.009 .153 -.132 
Yemen .485 .146 -.494 -.306 
Yemen PDR .225 -.125 .071 -.060 
Yugoslavia .337 .034 .165 -.103 
Zaire .239 -2.130 1.310 .097 
Zambia .267 -.034 .371 .025 
Zimbabwe .463 -.022 .151 .111 
APPENDIX B 
FACTOR SCORES BY COUNTRY OF THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
COUNTRIES FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 
Afghanistan .458 .048 -.328 -.384 
Albania -1.599 .298 -.310 .375 
Algeria .411 .113 -.314 -.296 
Angola .629 -1.196 3.433 1.767 
Antigua-Barbuda -.140 2.662 2.276 -.475 
Argentina -1.615 .391 -.206 -.217 
Australia -1.575 .304 -.284 .322 
Austria -1. 718 .087 -.052 .489 
Bahamas .579 .065 -.088 .014 
Bahrain .559 .042 -.266 -.114 
Bangladesh .723 .187 -.394 -.038 
Barbados .427 -.025 -.278 .029 
Belarus -1.253 -1.489 3.727 -.151 
Belgium -1.606 .649 -.121 .094 
Belize .525 -.458 -.445 1.282 
Benin .408 -.008 .225 -.145 
Bhutan .354 .275 -.455 -1.404 
Bolivia .431 -.087 -.137 -.036 
Botswana .589 .026 -.248 -.029 
Brazil .470 .103 -.282 -.298 
Brunei Darussalam .571 .133 -.300 .116 
Bulgaria -1.648 .485 -.138 .533 
Burkina Faso .466 -.772 3.124 -.173 
Burundi .460 -.134 .094 -.083 
Cambodia .930 2.674 1.188 2.749 
Cameroon .624 -.242 -.162 -.058 
Canada -2.032 -.405 .043 .586 
Cape Verde .754 -.156 -.403 -.087 
Central Africa Rep. 1.373 .003 -.288 -.105 
Chad .557 .042 -.266 -.114 
Chile .514 .275 -.356 -.192 
China .995 .188 -.022 -1.753 
Colombia .425 -.010 .224 -.021 
Comoros .548 -.306 -.878 2.110 
Congo .732 -.686 .723 -.383 
Costa Rica .545 -.203 .090 .046 
Ivory Coast .215 -.394 -2.303 .668 
Cuba .576 .131 -.136 -1.371 
Cyprus .157 -.163 .209 -.471 
Czechoslovakia -2.231 .243 .089 .579 
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Denmark -1. 959 .431 -.095 .205 
Djibouti .696 .068 -.455 -.204 
Dominica .026 -6.413 5.240 -.200 
Dominican Republic .206 2.891 2.110 -1.147 
Ecuador .542 .127 -.414 -.094 
Egypt .559 .042 -.266 -.114 
El Salvador .891 3.001 2.520 -1.157 
Equatorial Guinea .828 .114 -.449 -.269 
Estonia -2.976 .065 -1.176 .170 
Ethiopia .431 -.001 -.324 -.228 
Fiji .071 -.031 -.230 -.072 
Finland -1.864 .347 -.435 .616 
France -1.519 .391 .451 -2.160 
Gabon .516 .245 -.397 -.119 
Gambia .499 .149 -.385 -.318 
Germany -2.217 .471 -.100 .463 
Ghana .317 -.525 3.243 -.479 
Greece -1. 803 -.092 .311 .190 
Grenada 1.059 -.616 2.560 3.251 
Guatemala .852 -.249 -.677 3.630 
Guinea .559 .042 -.266 -.114 
Guinea-Bissau .780 -.ooo .063 -.667 
Guyana .535 .023 -.252 -.045 
Haiti .575 -.385 -.232 .944 
Honduras .377 -.002 -.153 -.008 
Hungary -2.021 .430 -.163 .850 
Iceland -1. 942 .327 -.085 -.010 
India .620 .061 .405 -2.353 
Indonesia .477 .153 -.297 -.245 
Iran .518 .010 -.242 .004 
Iraq .916 .132 -.078 .445 
Ireland -1.720 .209 -.094 .468 
Israel -.430 -3.926 -4.711 1.724 
Italy -2.163 .350 -.157 .530 
Jamaica .188 -.022 -.038 .164 
Japan -1.624 .292 .206 .199 
Jordan .590 .013 -.354 -.215 
Kenya .387 -.017 1.061 -.569 
Korea DPR .459 -.338 -.391 -.019 
Korea Rep. -1.253 -.134 .191 -.399 
Kuwait .716 .098 -.324 -.224 
Laos .350 .129 -.156 -1.046 
Latvia -1.527 -.508 -.416 -.325 
Lebanon .510 -.076 -.107 .021 
Lesotho .531 .072 -.216 .108 
Liberia .580 .551 .052 -.300 
Libya .488 -.068 -.210 -.005 
Liechtenstein -2.011 .157 -.129 .208 
Lithuania -1.692 .413 -.070 -.056 
Luxembourg -2.173 .363 -.153 .541 
Madagascar 1.480 .228 -.650 -.689 
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Malawi .670 .836 -.290 .207 
Malaysia .518 .010 -.242 .004 
Maldives .533 .013 -.244 -.007 
Mali .193 -.156 -.475 .042 
Malta -.897 -.108 .132 .306 
Marshal Islands -.536 .009 -.745 -.625 
Mauritania .404 -.086 -.305 .115 
Mauritius -.080 .004 -.588 -.232 
Mexico .534 .021 -.251 -.050 
Micronesia .595 -.118 -.048 -.530 
Mongolia .730 .110 -.519 -.022 
Morocco .458 .276 -.398 -.145 
Mozambique .686 .060 -.361 -.ooo 
Namibia .518 .ooo -.229 -.199 
Nepal .614 -.017 -.342 -.048 
Netherlands -1.666 .574 -.113 .136 
New Zealand -1. 401 .271 -.312 .247 
Nicaragua .545 -.067 -.186 -.012 
Niger .626 -.024 -.370 -.166 
Nigeria .535 .023 -.252 -.045 
Norway -2.040 .332 -.089 -.021 
Omen .559 .042 -.266 -.114 
Pakistan .518 .010 -.242 .004 
Panama -.978 -.785 3.558 .048 
Papua New Guinea .729 -.178 -.797 -.205 
Paraguay .040 -.098 -.173 -.179 
Peru .640 .081 -.593 -.190 
Philippines .691 .077 -.308 -.160 
Poland -1. 956 .380 -.244 .454 
Portugal -1.863 .266 -.039 .347 
Qatar .518 .010 -.242 .004 
Romania -1. 831 .396 -.136 .459 
Rwanda 1.695 2.465 1.391 2.902 
St. Kitts & Nevis .620 -.825 1.450 2.972 
st. Lucia .469 .115 -.117 .034 
st. Vincent-Grenadines .150 .090 -.307 -.096 
Samoa -.012 -.132 -.112 -.151 
Sao Tome and principe .843 .096 -.428 -.122 
Saudi Arabia .546 .067 -.274 .108 
Senegal .796 -.103 -.184 -.138 
Seychelles 1.011 .062 -.846 -.786 
Sierra Leone .657 -.498 -.865 3.362 
Singapore .483 .050 -.193 -.043 
Solomon Islands .142 -.324 -.510 -.034 
Somalia 1.138 -.277 .074 -.224 
South Africa .535 .023 -.252 -.045 
Spain -1.930 -.086 .414 .318 
Sri Lanka .544 .076 -.268 • 012 
Sudan .308 .101 -.485 -.192 
Suriname .535 .023 -.252 -.045 
Swaziland .536 -.092 -.024 -.018 
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Sweden -1.996 .286 -.203 .209 
Syria .765 .029 -.168 .467 
Tanzania .520 -.032 .109 -.156 
Thailand .433 .074 -.280 -.123 
Togo .417 -.007 -.257 .036 
Trinidad and Tobago .522 .013 -.244 -.007 
Tunisia .539 .067 -.297 -.199 
Turkey -1. 500 -.102 .136 -.598 
Uganda .547 .052 -.021 -.344 
Ukraine -.210 -.012 .114 .446 
United Arab Emirates .518 .010 -.242 .004 
United Kingdom -1. 020 1.076 .605 -4.580 
United States -.119 -3.928 -.969 -5.915 
USSR -.538 -5.728 .119 1.137 
Uruguay .173 .478 .429 .217 
Vanuatu .135 .165 -.682 -.153 
Venezuela .542 .127 -.414 -.094 
Viet Nam .372 .035 -.278 -.230 
Yemen .354 .087 -.328 -.381 
Yugoslavia .470 .103 -.282 -.298 
Zaire .019 2.645 1.936 -1.154 
Zambia .536 .029 -.018 -.111 
Zimbabwe .444 .054 -.417 .671 
